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Notes
GENTILE v. STATE BAR OF NEVADA: TRIAL IN THE "COURT OF
PUBLIC OPINION" AND COPING WITH MODEL RULE
3.6-WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Eight years after the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,' lawyers and courts continue to
struggle with the scope of restraint on lawyers' speech as governed by
the ABA's Model Rule 3.6.2 The struggle continues despite the United
1. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 201, at lxv
(2d ed. 1990) (Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1983). For a discussion of the historical development of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see infra notes 28-55 and accompanying
text.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983). Rule 3.6
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a rea-
sonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it
will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudica-
tive proceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to
have such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a
criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, and the statement relates to:
(1) The character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of
a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the iden-
tity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incar-
ceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the
existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement
given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure
to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or
the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or
test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or
suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if dis-
closed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime,
unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the
charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed
innocent until and unless proven guilty.
(619)
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States Supreme Court's recent review of an alleged Rule 3.6 violation in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.3 The difficulty in circumscribing extrajudi-
cial speech of attorneys results from the confrontation of two constitu-
tional guarantees-the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.4 These
two constitutional provisions come into direct conflict under Model
Rule 3.6, which prohibits certain speech by attorneys when such speech
presents a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudica-
tive proceeding." 5
Thirty-one states, in addition to Nevada, have adopted the ABA's
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b)(l-5), a lawyer involved
in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without
elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including
the general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or de-
fense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of
the persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and infor-
mation necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person
involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
hood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of
the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or
agencies and the length of the investigation.
Id.
3. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
4. Irving R. Kaufman, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
on "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 393 (1968) (research report by
Judicial Conference of the United States to promulgate guidelines for corrective
action to protect juries from prejudicial publicity as result of Supreme Court's
decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)). The First Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...... U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
For historical commentary in this area, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 547-62 (1976) (discussing history of the struggle between First and
Sixth Amendments commencing with trial of Aaron Burr in 1807) and Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-53 (1966) (providing impetus for development of
professional rules governing extrajudicial speech of attorneys).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983). "Substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding" is contained in
620
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Model Rule 3.6, either verbatim or with insignificant variation. 6 Gentile
is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court has reviewed
the constitutionality of professional regulations governing an attorney's
extrajudicial speech. 7 In Gentile, the State Bar of Nevada charged Mr.
Dominic Gentile, an experienced, well-respected criminal defense attor-
ney, with violating Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177-a rule identical to
Model Rule 3.6.8 The State Bar of Nevada contended that Mr. Gentile
breached his ethical obligation under Rule 177 because of certain pre-
trial statements made to the press. 9 The Supreme Court of Nevada af-
firmed the state bar's decision.' 0
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that Nevada's ap-
plication of Rule 177 was void for vagueness. I ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
writing for Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Souter, went beyond
this narrow holding to discuss the First Amendment implications of Rule
177. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in dicta that the "substantial likeli-
section 1 of Nevada's Rule 177 and the analogous section (a) in the ABA's Rule
3.6. For the complete text of Rule 3.6, see supra note 2.
6. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2741.
7. See Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense
Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003, 1025 (1984). In 1984, Professor
Swift stated: "[T]he Supreme Court has not had occasion to review the constitu-
tional validity of professional regulations restricting trial publicity...." Id.
Since 1984, the Supreme Court has reviewed only two cases involving First
Amendment constitutionality and access to pretrial information. See Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (holding that protective order
preventing media abuse of information obtained through pretrial discovery wasjustified); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 2, 13-
14 (1986) (holding that right of access to information in preliminary hearing of
criminal proceeding depended on "substantial probability" that access would
deprive defendant of fair trial). Neither case involved professional rules gov-
erning extrajudicial speech of attorneys.
8. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990) (Rule 177
identical to ABA Model Rule 3.6 except for numbering of sections and subsec-
tions), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 669, rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); see also NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. Sup. Ct. Rule 177 (Michie 1991). For the complete text of Rule 3.6,
see supra note 2.
9. Gentile, 787 P.2d at 387. For the complete text of Mr. Gentile's opening
remarks at the pretrial press conference, see infra note 112.
10. Id. For the Supreme Court of Nevada's decision, see infra notes 122-23.
11. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991). The
Supreme Court's multi-part, triple-authored, five-four reversal of Nevada's deci-
sion is confusing. Justice Kennedy announced the holding of the Court and de-
livered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and VI. Id. at 2731-32,
2736. He also wrote a minority opinion with respect to Parts I, II, IV and V in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id. at 2723.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I and II, and authored a dissenting opinion with respect to Part III, in
which Justices White, Scalia and Souter joined. Id.
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, joined Parts I and II of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, but believed that Nevada's rule was void for vague-
ness for the reasons set out in Part III ofJustice Kennedy's opinion; accordingly,
she joined Parts III and VI. Id.
1992] NOTE
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hood of material prejudice" standard used in Rule 3.6 to restrain attor-
neys' speech is constitutional because it is sufficiently narrowly tailored
to achieve the compelling state objective of preventing prejudice to an
adjudicative proceeding.' 2 The Gentile opinion, lacking consensus in
both the holding and the dicta, leaves attorneys to speculate as to what
may or may not be said in the "court of public opinion."''
This Note will first present a brief history of the professional rules
and the First Amendment standards pertaining to trial publicity.14 The
Gentile opinion will then be explained. 15 A discussion of the void for
vagueness holding, 16 and the dicta relating to the "substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice" standard, 17 will be used as a springboard
for the author's proposal of a revised Model Rule 3.6.18 The Rule will
be revised by restructuring grammar and adding two new "safe harbor"
provisions.' 9 Comments are included to clarify the text of the revised
rule. 20 The proposed rule employs a "balancing approach," in conjunc-
tion with a high level of scrutiny, to determine whether extrajudicial
speech by an attorney has a "substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding." 2 '
II. BACKGROUND
Since the 1800s, "American legal history [has been] studded with
notorious examples of the impact of widespread and uncontrolled in-
flammatory publicity upon the administration of criminal justice." 22
12. Id. at 2745 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J.), 2744 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting), 2748
(O'Connor, J., concurring). For example, Justice Kennedy noted that "[a] de-
fense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment
or reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of
public opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried." Id. at 2729. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, opined that prior Supreme Court cases
"plainly indicate[d] that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established
for regulation of the press." Id. at 2744 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
14. See infra notes 28-103 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104-70 and accompanying text.
16. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (void for vagueness holding).
17. See id. at 2745 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" dicta). "[Slubstantial likelihood of material prejudice" is the
standard used in Model Rule 3.6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.6 (1983). For the complete text of Rule 3.6, see supra note 2.
18. See infra notes 171-219 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 183-211 and accompanying text.
20. See text following note 182 and note 216.
21. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
22. Kaufman, supra note 4, at 394-95. The Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System made three recommendations:
First.... each United States District Court has the power and the duty
to control the release of prejudicial information by attorneys who are
members of the bar of that court, and [the Committee] recommends
4
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Such publicity can become so prejudicial that it denies individuals their
constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.23 Difficulties en-
sue when the courts or state legislatures try to protect the right to a fair
trial because such regulations or restraints often trammel on the First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.24 In
Mares v. United States,2 5 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ar-
ticulated the quandary that this situation presents:
The problem presented is incapable of a satisfactory solution.
Media of publicity have a right to report what happens.... An
accused has a right to a trial by an impartial jury on evidence
which is legally admissible. The public has a right to demand
and expect "fair trials designed to end in just judgments."
These rights must be accommodated in the best possible
manner.
2 6
Model Rule 3.6 seeks to accommodate the struggle between these
conflicting constitutional rights.2 7 A brief chronology of the develop-
ment of the law and professional rules governing attorneys' extrajudicial
action by local rule to restrict the release of such information on pen-
alty of disciplinary action. Second, the Committee believes that the
court has a similar power and duty to prohibit prejudicial disclosures by
courthouse personnel . . . [and] recommends that each District Court
act by local rule to forbid such disclosure. Finally, it is clear that the
court has the power and the duty to regulate the conduct of a trial so as
to insulate the proceedings from prejudicial influences.
Id. at 401.
23. For the text of the Sixth Amendment provision guaranteeing a fair trial
by an impartial jury, see supra note 4. The Supreme Court has reversed a
number of convictions where trial conditions were saturated with prejudicial
publicity. Kaufman, supra note 4, at 395; see, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 362-63 (1966) (reversing denial of habeas petition because trial judge did
not protect accused from inherently prejudicial publicity saturating community);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-52 (1965) (holding televising of criminal pro-
ceeding inherently prejudicial and denial of due process); Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723, 724-27 (1963) (holding state court's denial of change of venue
after accused's confession repeatedly televised was denial of fair trial and due
process); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725, 727-28 (1961) (holding death sen-
tence void and in violation of Constitution because of overwhelming community
prejudice resulting from pretrial radio, newspaper and television publicity).
24. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-61, 570 (1976)
(refusing to impose prior restraints on press regarding coverage of murder trial
and affirming constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech). For the relevant
text of the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press, see
supra note 4.
25. 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967), appeal after remand, 409 F.2d 1083 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969). In Mares, during a trial for armed
robbery charges, published newspaper accounts reported information about the
defendants' prior admissions of guilt which had been ruled inadmissible at trial.
Id. at 807. A new trial was ordered because the trial judge failed to poll the
nonsequestered jury about exposure to the newspaper articles. Id. at 805.
26. Id. at 808 (footnotes omitted).
27. For the language of Model Rule 3.6, see supra note 2.
1992] NOTE 623
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speech is presented below to frame the current status of the law and lay
the groundwork for an analysis of the Gentile opinion.
A. Historical Development of the Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules are an outgrowth of a tenet of American jurispru-
dence which maintains that a court can control the professional life of a
lawyer.2 8 This tenet is often relied upon by American courts in the as-
sertion and exercise of their authority to discipline and disbar lawyers
whose conduct departs from prescribed standards. 29 In 1917, Judge
Cardozo articulated this principle, when he stated that "[m]embership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."' 30 These "condi-
tions" ultimately became embodied as prescribed standards for lawyers'
conduct in the codes of professional ethics that evolved in the United
States.3 1
The Alabama State Bar Association promulgated and adopted the
first code of professional ethics in the United States in 1887.32 Building
on the Alabama code, the ABA formulated the "Canons of Professional
Ethics" in 1908 and encouraged bar associations throughout the coun-
try to adopt them as binding on their membership. 33 Canon 20 warned
28. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) (disbarment pro-
ceeding iterating philosophy that lawyers as "officers of the court" are subject to
court's control).
29. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2740 (1991).
30. In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783, 786-87 (N.Y. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S.
661 (1918) (affirming order of disbarment against attorney charged with collect-
ing bribes and holding that attorney in disciplinary proceedings could not claim
immunity on ground of self incrimination within meaning of penal statute).
31. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 201, at lxv. Throughout the nine-
teenth century, lawyers' conduct was governed by fragmentary common law and
compilations of unofficial advisory legal ethics. Id. The most famous of the
early compilations was David Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment, issued in 1836. Id.
32. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 23 (1953). Colorado, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
and Wisconsin adopted Alabama's Code, with minor changes, between 1887 and
1906. Id. During the same time California, Oregon and Washington adopted
"duties" of an attorney taken from the oath for advocates prescribed by the laws
of the Swiss Canton of Geneva. Id. The 1899 charter of the State Bar Associa-
tion of Louisiana contained a Code of Ethics similar to the Alabama Code. Id.
The Bar Association of Jacksonville, Florida, adopted similar measures by print-
ing "Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment" in its 1906 Yearbook.
Id. By 1908, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
South Dakota and Utah developed Codes of Ethics resulting from codification of
statutory enactments or action of the bar associations. Id. Between 1905 and
1908, the bar associations of Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Vermont had charged committees with working
on canons and conferring with the American Bar Association Committee. Id. at
23-24.
33. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 201, at lxv. The original Canons
omitted more recent topics, such as conflicts of interest, and spoke only of
others in generalities. Id. at lxv, lxvi. Out of necessity, the decisional law and
[Vol. 37: p. 619
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lawyers against interfering with a pending trial by stating that
"[n]ewspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated liti-
gation may interfere with a fair trial ... and otherwise prejudice the due
administration ofjustice. Generally they are to be condemned."13 4 The
Canons remained in effect as the ABA's authoritative source of profes-
sional ethics for attorneys until 1964.35
Between 1964 and 1966, various groups and agencies, responding
to an increasing concern over prejudicial trial publicity, began propos-
ing measures designed to cope with the problem. 3 6 In June 1966, the
bar association ethics opinions grew to fill in these "gaps." Id. at lxv. The 1908
Canons had quasi-authoritative legal status. Id. Because the courts and discipli-
nary authorities often referred to the Canons as the basis of a decision, they
became incorporated into a "common law" of professional ethics in the 1930s.
Id.
34. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2740 (1991) (quoting
Canon 20). In the years following the advent of Canon 20, the Supreme Court
grappled with the effects of publicity on a defendant's right to an impartial trial.
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 395 (citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310,
311-13 (1959) (juror exposure to inadmissible newspaper accounts of prior
conviction held prejudicial and entitled defendant to new trial)); see also Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-52 (1965) (televising of highly sensational criminal
proceeding held to be inherently prejudicial and denial of due process); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724-27 (1963) (holding that interview in which de-
fendant confessed to crime which had been televised repeatedly in area from
which jurors were drawn when judge denied change of venue constituted denial
of fair trial and due process); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (vacatingjudg-
ment for death sentence because state court judge denied three motions for
change of venue and eight motions for continuance, failing to ensure impartial
jury in the face of pervasive, inflammatory and prejudicial publicity).
These decisions provided impetus for the Court to require more stringent
regulation of attorneys and other individuals within a court's jurisdiction. For
the Court's mandate regarding prejudicial publicity, see infra note 38 and ac-
companying text.
35. In 1964, the ABA appointed a committee to revise the Canons. HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 1, § 201, at lxvi. The Wright Committee, named after its
chairman, Edward L. Wright, developed the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which the ABA adopted in 1969. Id. The courts and bar associa-
tions in virtually all jurisdictions in the United States adopted the Model Code
within a few years after its promulgation in 1970. Id.
36. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 398. The events surrounding the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy led the Warren Commission in 1964 to recom-
mend that
the representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the
news media work together to establish ethical standards concerning the
collection and presentation of information to the public so that there
will be no interference with pending criminal investigations, court pro-
ceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial.
Robert A. Ainsworth, "Fair Trial-Free Press," 45 F.R.D. 417 (1968) (quoting War-
ren Commission Report on assassination of President Kennedy in address
before Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference discussing fair trial-free press issue).
The Warren Commission Report was in part responsible for the creation by
the ABA of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press in 1964, now
known as the Reardon Committee. Id. The committee's chairman was Justice
Paul Reardon of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Id. In light of the Supreme
7
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United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell 3 7 laid down a man-
date for courts to control prosecutors, defense counsel and the prejudi-
cial impact of publicity on the jury system. 38 The Sheppard Court
condemned the unfair and prejudicial publicity Dr. Sheppard received
during the course of an investigation and trial for murder.3 9 The
Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), and based on
initial results obtained from a twenty-month study, the Reardon Committee
made specific recommendations on how to control the impact of publicity on the
administration of criminal justice. Id. at 418-19. In a compilation of cases be-
tween January 1963 and March 1965, the Reardon Report found that there were
approximately 100 reported decisions in which the defendant claimed that prej-
udicial publicity prevented obtaining a fair trial. Id. at 419. The Reardon Com-
mittee also felt that these cases were just "the tip of the iceberg," and that the
actual number of cases involving prejudice was undoubtedly much larger. Id.
The Reardon Committee recommended court control of prejudicial trial
publicity in three areas: control of attorneys by local rule, control of courthouse
personnel by local rule, and control of conduct during trial to insulate proceed-
ings from prejudicial influences. Id. at 424. Furthermore, the Reardon Report
implied that courts could place restrictions on the press. Id. at 420-23; cf. Kauf-
man, supra note 4, at 401. The Judicial Conference of the United States adopted
the same three recommendations but declined to adopt a direct "curb or re-
straint" on publication by the press. Id.
Following the release of the Reardon Report in 1966, a number of legal and
media organizations studied and released reports regarding the issue of fair trial
and free press. Id. at 397. The American Newspaper Publishers Association re-
leased its report and recommendations in January 1967. Id. at 397 n.6. Shortly
thereafter in 1967, the Medina Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York issued its final report entitled "Freedom of the Press and Fair
Trial." Id. at 397 n.7.
The Medina Committee was a committee of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, chaired by Senior Judge Harold R. Medina of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. Originally organized in
1963, the committee issued in 1965 its interim report, "Radio, Television and
the Administration of Justice: A Documented Survey of Materials." Id. For a
discussion of other committees and reports proposing recommendations re-
garding trial publicity, see Swift, supra note 7, at 1020-21, 1031-44.
37. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
38. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 395. The Court in Sheppard directed that
"courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences." Id. at 396-97 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363
(emphasis added)). Furthermore, the Court admonished prosecutors, defense
counsel, the accused, witnesses, court staff and enforcement officers who were
under the jurisdiction of the court from frustrating the fair administration of
justice. Id.
39. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 352-63. Marilyn Sheppard, Dr. Sheppard's preg-
nant wife, was bludgeoned to death in their lakeshore home in Bay Village,
Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland. Id. at 335-36. On the day of the tragedy, Dr.
Sheppard reported that he had fallen asleep on the couch after dinner and had
awakened to a cry from his wife in the early morning hours. Id. at 336. He
hurried upstairs and saw a "form" standing next to his wife's bed. Id. Sheppard
struggled with the "form," was struck on the back of the neck and rendered
unconscious. Id. When he regained consciousness, Sheppard found himself on
the floor next to his wife's bed. Id. He rose, looked at his wife, took her pulse
and believed that "she was gone." Id. Sheppard then went to his son's room
and found him unmolested. Id. Hearing a noise, he went downstairs to find the
8
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Supreme Court in Sheppard, noting the prevalence of unfair and prejudi-
cial news commentary on pending trials, concluded:
"form" running out the door. Id. He pursued it, grappled with it on the beach
and again lost consciousness. Id. When Sheppard recovered, he returned home
and called his neighbor, Mayor Houk of Bay Village. Id. Both the Mayor and his
wife came over immediately and found Dr. Sheppard slumped in a chair. Id.
When they asked "What happened?" Sheppard replied, "I don't know, but
someone ought to try to do something for Marilyn." Id.
From the outset of the investigation, local officials and the media focused
suspicion on Dr. Sheppard. Id. at 337. The Coroner, Dr. Gerber, was reported
to have told his men after a search of the house and premises on the morning of
the tragedy, "Well, it is evident the doctor did this, so let's go get the confession
out of him." Id. The Coroner then proceeded to examine and interrogate Dr.
Sheppard while Sheppard was under sedation in a hospital room. Id. Sheppard
was told by a police officer that lie detector tests were "infallible" so "you might
as well tell us all about it now." Id. at 337-38. At the end of the interrogation
the same officer told Sheppard: "I think you killed your wife." Id. at 338. Shep-
pard made himself available for frequent and extended questioning without the
presence of an attorney until the time he was subpoenaed at the Coroner's in-
quest. Id.
The Cleveland news media "saturated the area where the trial was to be
held with highly inflammatory news stories and editorials about the defendant
and the trial." Kaufman, supra note 4, at 396. In a newspaper story on the day
of Marilyn Sheppard's funeral, the Assistant County Attorney, later the chief
prosecutor of Sheppard, vehemently criticized Sheppard's family for not permit-
ting immediate questioning. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 338. After this criticism,
headlines repeatedly stressed Sheppard's lack of cooperation with the police and
other officials. Id. at 338-39.
At the request of the Coroner, Sheppard reenacted the alleged murder in
his home in the presence of the Coroner, police and a group of newsmen appar-
ently invited by the Coroner. Id. at 338. Front page headlines emphasized
Sheppard's refusal to take a lie detector test; other stories talked of Sheppard's
refusal to be injected with "truth serum." Id. at 339. OnJuly 20, an editorial on
the front page stated that somebody is "getting away with murder." Id. On July
21, another front page editorial was entitled "Why No Inquest? Do It Now, Dr.
Gerber." Id. The same day the Coroner called an inquest and subpoenaed Dr.
Sheppard. Id.
The inquest was held the following day in a school gym in front of a long
table occupied by reporters, television and radio personnel and broadcasting
equipment. Id. Sheppard was brought into the gym by the police, who searched
him in full view of several hundred spectators. Id. Sheppard's counsel were
present for the three-day inquest, but were not allowed to participate. Id.
Newspaper stories disclosed information as fact that was never admitted
into evidence at trial. Id. at 340. In a story on July 26, a detective was quoted as
saying that scientific tests at the Sheppard home had definitely established that
the killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bedroom to the down-
stairs, thereby casting doubt on Sheppard's account of the murder. Id. at 340.
This evidence was never produced at trial. Id. The newspapers also delved into
Sheppard's personal life, elaborating on an extramarital affair Sheppard had
with Susan Hayes as the motive for the crime. Id. This extramarital relationship
was dissected and enlarged, portraying Sheppard as an infidel involved with
many women. Id. The testimony at trial showed that the only illicit relationship
Sheppard had had was with Susan Hayes. Id. at 340-41.
The intensity of the publicity continued unabated in the courtroom itself,
and, despite motions by defense counsel for change of venue, continuance and
mistrial, no action was taken by the state court. Id. at 348. A long temporary
9
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Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an im-
partial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasive-
ness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against the accused. 40
This mandate of the Supreme Court in Sheppard provided the impetus
for "one of the most searching debates in recent legal history as to
methods of solving the problems of fair trial and free press."'4 '
In 1968, the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 42 re-
sponding to the Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard, took stock of all
the available information on the "Free Press-Fair Trial Issue" and re-
ported its recommendations to the ChiefJustice of the United States.
43
The Committee proposed that, in the interest of establishing a uniform
standard of conduct for attorneys in criminal cases in both state and
federal courts, Canon 20 should be replaced with the formulation in the
table running the width of the courtroom was set up inside the bar less than
three feet from the jury box. Id. at 342-43. Approximately 20 representatives of
newspapers and wire services were assigned seats at this table by the court. Id.
at 343. The first four rows of benches were assigned to the press, with only the
last row reserved for the Sheppard family. Id. Representatives of the news me-
dia used all the room on the courtroom floor for private lines and telegraphic
equipment to expedite reporting of the trial. Id. Broadcasting facilities were set
up on the third floor of the courthouse next door to the jury room. Id. Televi-
sion and newsreel cameras took pictures of the trial participants on the steps in
front of the courthouse. Id. Prospective jurors were photographed during jury
selection, and after the trial opened, witnesses, counsel and jurors were photo-
graphed and televised whenever they left the courtroom. Id. at 343-44. All of
this continued during the nine weeks of the trial. Id. at 344.
The courtroom was so crowded with representatives of the news media,
causing noise and confusion, that a loud speaker had to be installed to hear the
witnesses and counsel. Id. The reporters who were clustered inside the bar
made it impossible for Dr. Sheppard and his counsel to speak confidentially dur-
ing the proceedings. Id. It was often necessary to adjourn into the judge's
chambers to have privacy or to raise a point out of the hearing of the jury and
reporters. Id. Even then, the news media representatives packed the judge's
anteroom so that counsel could hardly return to the courtroom. Id.
Dr. Sheppard was convicted of murder. He then petitioned on writ of
habeas corpus to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 335. The writ was
issued, a new trial was ordered, and Dr. Sheppard was ultimately acquitted.
Ainsworth, supra note 36, at 419 (address before Eighth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence discussing fair trial-free press issue).
40. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362.
41. Kaufman, supra note 4, at 397.
42. The Committee on the Operation of the Jury System was a committee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States and was reactivated on Septem-
ber 12, 1966 to study the need for promulgating guidelines or taking other cor-
rective actions to shield federal juries from prejudicial publicity in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard. Kaufman, supra note 4, at 391-92.
43. For a complete discussion of the Committee's recommendations, see
generally id. See also Ainsworth, supra note 36.
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ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility. 44 Disciplinary Rule 7-107
(DR 7-107) was promulgated on this recommendation. 4 5
DR 7-107 delineated prohibited and permissible extrajudicial state-
ments for different stages of civil and criminal proceedings. 4 6 Many
courts found DR 7-107 constitutionally overbroad. 4 7 The Code's struc-
ture itself, attempting to differentiate legal standards from guidelines,
created practical problems in interpretation. 48 Additional confusion re-
sulted from the fact that the Code did not address certain important
professional issues.4 9 Finally, other Code provisions, in particular those
concerning advertising, were held to be unconstitutional as inconsistent
with the First Amendment. 50
44. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 407. The Judicial Conference Commit-
tee's recommendations incorporated the results from both the Medina and
Reardon Reports and contemplated "an absolute prohibition of extrajudicial
disclosure by attorneys of prior criminal records, confessions, tests, witnesses,
opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the merits of the case or the
evidence involved, as well as other described matters potentially prejudicial in
nature." Id.
Concomitantly with the activities of the Judicial Conference Committee, in
1964 the ABA appointed a committee to revise the Canons. For a brief discus-
sion of this committee, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1980). DR
7-107 sets forth, in parts (A) and (B), lists of prohibited and permissible extraju-
dicial speech similar to Model Rule 3.6. For the text of Model Rule 3.6, see supra
note 2. DR 7-107 has eight additional parts, with more lists applying to different
stages of criminal trials, civil actions and administrative proceedings. The rule
required careful reading to comprehend which lists applied under which circum-
stances. For a discussion of the nature of this rule, see infra notes 46-49.
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1980). The
Code of Professional Responsibility had a tri-partite structure: broad general
'axiomatic' principles ('Canons'), aspirational and explanatory provisions ('Ethi-
cal Considerations' or 'ECs'), and black letter rules ('Disciplinary Rules' or
'DRs'). HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 201, at lxvi. In theory, the DRs were
minimum legal standards, while the Canons and ECs were guidelines. In prac-
tice, however, it was impossible to maintain this separation, and the Canons and
ECs were often given the same binding effect as the DRs. Id.
47. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, at § 3.6:102, 665. Practically every
court that considered challenges to DR 7-107 said the rule was overbroad. Id.
(citing Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975)); see also Joseph T. Rotondo,
Note, A Constitutional Assessment of Court Rules Restricting Lawyer Comment on Pending
Litigation, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1106, 1107-11 (1980). For a discussion of the
overbreadth doctrine, see infra note 54.
48. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 201, at lxvi (discussing tri-partite
structure of the Code).
49. Id. The original Code of Professional Responsibility did not address
conflicts of interest regarding former clients. Id. The Code also did not account
for problems in nonlitigation situations. Id. Furthermore, the Code ignored is-
sues attendant with the practice of law in complex organizations by giving no
guidance regarding "entities" as clients. Id.
50. Id. at lxvi-ii; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 655-56 (1985) (reversing attorney reprimand under DR 2-101 for soliciting
women who used Dalkon Shield to join class action); Bates v. State Bar of Ar-
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Reacting to difficulties with interpretation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1977 and constitutional challenges to the valid-
ity of its provisions, the ABA appointed a Special Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards. 5 1 This Special Commission was
formed to recommend whether the Code should be revised or re-
placed. 52 A lengthy and controversial drafting process, which com-
menced in 1977, culminated in the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct at the August 1983 Annual Meeting. 53 ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 modified the language and for-
mat of DR 7-107 in an attempt to address constitutional problems of
vagueness and overbreadth. 54 As of June 1991, thirty-one states in ad-
dition to Nevada had adopted, either verbatim or with insignificant
changes, Rule 3.6.5 5
zona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that state's application of ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 violated First Amendment). For an
overview of Supreme Court decisions dealing with First Amendment rights of
lawyers to advertise, see STEVEN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 35-61 (2d ed. 1989).
51. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, at lxvii. This special commission was
known as the Kutak Commission, named after its chairman, RobertJ. Kutak. Id.
52. Id. The Kutak Commission recommended what would eventually be-
come the "Model Rules of Professional Conduct," a complete revision of the
Code in a "restatement" format with black letter rules and comments. Id.
53. See ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Preface, at v (1987).
54. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, at § 3.6:102, 665. For decisions hold-
ing DR 7-107 unconstitutionally overbroad, see Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding DR 7-107 unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause it restricted comments by lawyers involved in civil litigation); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding DR 7-
107 overbroad with respect to "reasonable likelihood" standard, stating proper
standard should be "serious and imminent threat" of interference with fair ad-
ministration ofjustice), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
Model Rule 3.6 differs substantially from DR 7-107 in four respects:
1) Rule 3.6 uses the "substantial likelihood" standard whereas DR 7-107 uses
"reasonable likelihood"; 2) Rule 3.6 contains a scienter element-"the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know"; 3) Rule 3.6 requires "material prejudice"
whereas DR 7-107 refers to statements which are "reasonably likely to interfere
with trial"; and 4) Rule 3.6 does not delineate different phases of criminal inves-
tigation and prosecution. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and
Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 876 (1990).
Although the drafters changed Model Rule 3.6 in an attempt to rectify the
constitutional objections to DR 7-107, the revised language used in Model Rule
3.6 is arguably even more constitutionally objectionable. Id. at 875 n.51. See
generally Swift, supra note 7. The void for vagueness holding in Gentile buttresses
this contention. For a discussion of the void for vagueness holding in Gentile, see
infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
55. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2741 (1991). Only
eleven states had adopted DR 7-107 of the ABA's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. Id.
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B. First Amendment Considerations
1. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Gentile held that Nevada's application of Rule
177 (ABA Rule 3.6) was void for vagueness. 56 Constitutional due pro-
cess requires that a legislative enactment be held void for vagueness if
"[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." 57 Three important tenets of American
jurisprudence form the basis for the void for vagueness doctrine. First,
laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited. Second, laws must be explicit to prevent
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement. Third, a vague law pertaining
to First Amendment freedoms unacceptably "chills" the exercise of
those freedoms. 58 The void for vagueness doctrine requires that laws
must be drafted with sufficient precision to avoid ensnaring the inno-
cent, yet be adequately encompassing to achieve the legislative pur-
pose. 59 Because of the difficulty of this task, the Supreme Court will not
ordinarily hold a statute unconstitutional if only some protected speech
remains within the scope of prohibition. 60 In general, it is unlikely that
the Court will find an enactment void for vagueness, unless the individ-
ual challenging the statute is one of the ensnared innocents, and the
Court finds that it was practicable for the legislature to have drafted the
enactment more precisely. 6 1
An enactment may be void for vagueness "on its face" or void for
vagueness "as applied."'6 2 In reviewing vagueness challenges, the Court
56. Id. at 2731.
57. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1929) (holding
ambiguous minimum wage statute void for vagueness). See generally Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960).
58. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1972) (holding city
ordinance prohibiting willful making of noise adjacent to grounds where school
in session not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
59. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, §§ 12-31, at 1033
(1978).
60. Id. at 1034; see also United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (statutes are not "invalidated as vague simply because diffi-
culty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their
language").
61. Id.
62. See Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 109 n.224 (author explains that "on its
face" has multiple meanings not necessarily limited to words of statute as writ-
ten); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576-77 (1974) (statute prohibiting
public contemptuous treatment of United States flag held vague as applied with-
out benefit ofjudicial clarification; "vagueness as applied" and "vagueness on its
face" distinguished).
In Gentile,Justice Kennedy made a point of describing the Court's holding in
terms of Rule 177 being void for vagueness "as applied," expressly stating that
the Court was not called upon to determine the constitutionality of the ABA's
Model Rule 3.6, but only Nevada's Rule 177 as it has been interpreted and ap-
NOTE
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considers whether the literal scope of the statute had the benefit ofjudi-
cial interpretation in the state court below. 63 The Court frequently ren-
ders state decisions invalid by finding the state enactment void for
vagueness "as applied," but leaving the constitutional enforceability of
the statute itself unimpaired. 64 This is exactly what the Court did in
Gentile.65 This "as applied" mode of judicial review tested the constitu-
tionality of Rule 3.6 only as it applied to the particular set of facts of the
Gentile case.66 Unfortunately, this type of case-by-case review and defer-
ence to upholding the statute as written will leave the next challenger to
the vagaries of state interpretation- dependent on the state's compre-
hension and application of the Supreme Court's decision. 6 7
2. Constitutional Standards Applied to Professional Rules Governing
Extrajudicial Speech
Standards used to determine whether extrajudicial speech by an at-
torney can be regulated are currently embodied in professional rules
governing trial publicity.68 In addition to the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard presently incorporated into Model Rule
3.6 (and Nevada's Rule 177), the three other commonly applied formu-
lations are "clear and present danger," "serious and imminent threat"
and "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice. 69
plied by the State of Nevada. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720,
2723, 2725 (1991). Arguably, a holding of void for vagueness "on its face"
would have required that the Court challenge the constitutionality of ABA
Model Rule 3.6.
63. Smith, 415 U.S. at 573.
64. See Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 110 & n.226.
65. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731-32.
66. Id.; see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1124 (2d ed.
1991) (describing "as applied" analysis relating to overbreadth doctrine).
67. STONE, supra note 66, at 1124, 1130; see Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 871-75 (1970) (discussing virtual identity
of vagueness and overbreadth doctrines as they relate to First Amendment).
When a statute is held vague "as applied,"
[the statute] is remitted to a process of hammering out the limits of
intervention under the impact of particular fact situations in the expec-
tation that over time a core of definite coverage will take shape by ac-
cretion. But a prolonged and costly process of bringing clarity to
statutory commands, like the uncertain process of case by case excision,
holds preferred freedoms in abeyance for an indefinite period and tol-
erates the intimidation of protected activity caused by a law whose (lit-
eral or permissible) scope is uncertain.
Note, supra, at 873-74.
68. See Matheson, supra note 54, at 916 (citing commentators and criticism
of standards governing extrajudicial speech of attorneys).
69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Gentile (No. 89-
1836). For a discussion of "clear and present danger," see infra notes 70-83 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of "serious and imminent threat," see infra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of "reasonable likelihood
of prejudice," see infra notes 89-93.
632 [Vol. 37: p. 619
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a. Clear and Present Danger
The "clear and present danger" standard has been the traditional
test used by the Supreme Court to review the validity of suppressions of
speech.70 Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Schenck v. United
States,7 ' discussed whether laws could abridge the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment. He stated that "[t]he question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent." 7 2 After Schenck, Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test
underwent multiple permutations in the Court's decisions during subse-
quent years. 73
In Bridges v. California,74 the Court elaborated on the "clear and
present danger" standard, emphasizing that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished. 75 The "clear and present danger" standard
70. See generally Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger'
From Schenk to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 41.
71. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (using "clear and present danger" standard to hold
defendants violated § 3 of Espionage Act of 1917 by circulating documents op-
posing draft).
72. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
73. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (overruling Whitney
v. California and essentially neutralizing "clear and present danger" test as re-
lates to First Amendment); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (plural-
ity opinion adoptingJudge Learned Hand's formulation "whether the gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(Brandeis/Holmes concurrence stating that there must be reasonable ground to
fear serious evil and reasonable ground to believe that danger is imminent with
only emergency justifying suppression of speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (majority and dissent citing "clear and present danger" language of
Schenk); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Justice Holmes' dissent
warning that only present danger of immediate evil or intent to bring it about
warrants Congress limiting expression of opinion).
Professor Thomas Emerson has pointed out that the Supreme Court has
failed to develop a comprehensive, coherent theory for First Amendment analy-
sis in part because of the many permutations of the "clear and present danger"
test. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717 (1970).
74. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In Bridges, the Supreme Court overturned a con-
tempt citation based on a union leader's public release of a telegram threatening
a strike if the state court attempted to enforce its decision in a jurisdictional
dispute. Id. at 271. Applying the "clear and present danger" standard, the
Court stated that the substantive "evil" under consideration in determining
whether free speech should be restricted was the "disorderly and unfair adminis-
tration ofjustice." Id.
In discussing Bridges, Professor Tribe noted two points. First, a publication
impugning the integrity of a judge or the administration of justice generally im-
poses no "clear and present danger." Second, it is assumed that judges will not
be swayed in their decisions by public criticism. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 623-25.
75. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384
(1962) (evaluating out-of-court statements by sheriff using "clear and present
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underwent further metamorphosis in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia.76 ChiefJustice Burger stated that "Mr.Justice Holmes' test was
never intended 'to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a
formula for adjudicating cases.' ,,77 The "clear and present danger" test
requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magni-
tude of the danger flowing from the utterance and then to balance the
character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free
and unfettered expression. 78 Alternative means to serve the State's in-
terests should also be weighed. 79
The "clear and present danger" standard was ultimately applied by
the New York Supreme Court to professional rules restricting the extra-
judicial speech of attorneys in Markfield v. Association of the Bar.80 In
Markfield, one of the attorneys in a criminal trial participated in a radio-
aired panel discussion on prison rebellions while the trial was in pro-
gress. 8 1 The New York Association of the Bar charged the attorney with
professional misconduct and with violating DR 7-107.82 The New York
appellate court dismissed the charge of professional misconduct, hold-
danger" standard); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 371-73, 378 (1947) (revers-
ing contempt conviction of publisher, editorial writer and news reporter using
"clear and present danger" standard); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335
(1946) (reversing contempt convictions of newspaper publisher and associate
editor using "clear and present danger" standard).
76. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). ChiefJustice Burger questioned the relevance of
the "clear and present danger" standard under the facts of Landmark, and re-
fused to accept the Supreme Court of Virginia's mechanical application of the
standard. Id. at 842. Landmark involved a newspaper publisher who allegedly
violated a Virginia statute prohibiting the disclosure of information regarding
state proceedings investigating judicial misconduct. Id. at 831. The Supreme
Court found that punishment of third parties to the proceedings for publishing
truthful information about the state's activities violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 837, 845-46.
77. Id. at 842 (citing Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
78. Id. at 842-43.
79. Id. at 843.
80. 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1975). After
Schenk, the Supreme Court of the United States used the "clear and present dan-
ger" standard primarily "in reviewing contempt citations against non-attorneys for
comments or publications relating to pending judicial proceedings." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Gentile (No. 89-1836); see also Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384-85, 395 (1962) (sheriff's statement to press criticiz-
ing judge's charge to grand jury investigating racial block voting did not pose
"clear and present danger," and use of contempt to punish sheriff abridged
right of free speech); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 371 (1947) (newspaper's
criticism ofjudge's ruling fell short of meeting "clear and present danger" test);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263, 278 (1941) (reversing contempt cita-
tions for comments published in newspapers pertaining to pending litigation
because failed to meet "clear and present danger" test). Markfield signalled the
first application of the "clear and present danger" standard to extrajudicial
speech of attorneys. Markfield, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
81. Markfield, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 82, 84.
82. Id.
[Vol. 37: p. 619
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ing that the rule should be restricted only to those situations where the
extrajudicial statements presented a clear and present danger to the fair
administration of justice.8 3
b. Serious and Imminent Threat
The "serious and imminent threat" formulation derives from Craig
v. Harney,8 4 in which the United States Supreme Court used this lan-
guage interchangeably with "clear and present danger."8 5 In 1975, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer,86 applied the "serious and imminent threat" formula-
tion to attorneys in deciding that the ABA's DR 7-107 was unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad.8 7 The court, in its declaratory judgment,
emphasized that only those lawyer comments that "pose a 'serious and
imminent threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice
can be constitutionally proscribed." 8 8
c. Reasonable Likelihood
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Hirschkop v. Snead,8 9 declared that the "reasonable likelihood" standard
was to be applied to professional rules of conduct defining extrajudicial
speech of attorneys. 90 The ABA's 1970 Code of Professional Responsi-
bility also employs the "reasonable likelihood" formulation. 9 1 DR 7-
107 prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial comment that is
"reasonably likely" to interfere with the administration of justice.92
83. Id. at 84-85.
84. 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
85. See id at 372-73. After reaffirming the use of the "clear and present
danger" standard, the Court in Craig summarized by saying that freedom of
speech and the press cannot be impaired unless "there is no doubt that the ut-
terances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice." Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Gentile
(No. 89-1836). Previously, in 1941, the Court in Bridges had commingled the
language "serious" and "imminent" with the "clear and present danger" stan-
dard. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941).
86. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
87. Id. at 249.
88. Id. In Bauer, an association of lawyers sought an injunction against en-
forcement of a local rule that incorporated DR 7-107, proscribing extrajudicial
comments by attorneys during civil or criminal cases. Id. at 242-43. The court
rejected the "reasonable likelihood" standard in favor of the more stringent "se-
rious and imminent threat of interference with the fair administration ofjustice"
standard. Id. at 243.
89. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
90. Id. at 368. Hirschkop involved a suit filed by an attorney to challenge the
Virginia version of DR 7-107. Id. at 356. The court upheld the disciplinary rule
as constitutional, but found certain provisions to be overbroad and void for
vagueness. Id. at 356-57.
91. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1980).
92. Id. In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
19921 NOTE 635
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Courts applying the "reasonable likelihood" standard in restricting ex-
trajudicial speech of attorneys justify the use of a less stringent test for
attorneys because of their unique status as "officers of the court." '9 3
d. Substantial Likelihood of Material Prejudice
Model Rule 3.6 uses the "substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding" formulation in regulating the extra-
judicial speech of attorneys.9 4 This formulation is used by the majority
of states that have incorporated ABA Rule 3.6 into their professional
rules of ethics.9 5 Despite the prevalence of this formulation, there has
been a paucity ofjudicial opinions as to the proper interpretation of the
standard.96
The "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" formulation ap-
proximates the "clear and present danger" test.9 7 The Supreme Court
in Bauer, vehemently attacked this more lenient standard as being overbroad,
vague and not complying with constitutional standards. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249-
50.
93. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Gentile (No. 89-
1836); see, e.g., Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 369, 370; In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489
(1982).
94. For the full text of the Rule, see supra note 2. The "substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice" formulation can be found in section (a) of Rule 3.6.
95. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2741 n.l (1991)
(listing states that have adopted "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
formulation).
96. Gentile is the first Supreme Court case to address the issue of extrajudi-
cial speech of attorneys and professional no-comment rules, and the only case to
have addressed Rule 3.6. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Lower court
opinions have dealt exclusively with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity DR 7-107. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding DR 7-107 did not violate First Amendment with respect to criminal
trials, but that certain provisions were void for vagueness and that DR 7-107 was
overbroad in restricting comments made by lawyers associated with civil litiga-
tion and administrative hearings); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding DR 7-107 unconstitutionally overbroad as re-
lated to criminal litigation because "reasonable likelihood" standard improper-
proper standard should be "serious and imminent threat"; DR 7-107 unconsti-
tutional in regard to civil litigation if extrajudicial speech deemed presumptively
prohibited); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Mont. 1984) (holding DR 7-107
unconstitutional without creating clear standard for attorney conduct; court re-
fused to imply standard stating new rule should be drafted); Markfield v. Associ-
ation of the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84-85 (1975) (holding DR 7-107 should be
restricted only to situations where extrajudicial statements pose "clear and pres-
ent danger" to administration ofjustice), appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y.
1975); see also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 629 (1959) (holding attorney's speech
outside courtroom during trial did not impugn integrity of presiding judge; Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics not violated).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1983). Four
members of the Court in Gentile agreed that the "substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice" formulation in Model Rule 3.6 is equivalent to the traditional
"clear and present danger" standard. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Gentile
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has made no practical distinction between the "serious and imminent
threat" and "clear and present danger" formulations.9 8 Some courts
and commentators maintain that there is no difference between the
"reasonable likelihood" formulation and the other variants. 99 Although
four different semantic formulations have evolved in the courts, author-
ity exists for the proposition that no practical difference can be main-
tained among them when the standards are applied to restrictions on
speech. 10 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four members of the Court, in
dicta, proffered that the original "clear and present danger" standard
has yielded to a less demanding "substantial likelihood of material prej-
udice" standard in determining when an attorney's speech can be abro-
gated in favor of the fair administration of justice.' 0 ' While Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Gentile diluted the standard of First Amendment re-
view for attorneys from strict scrutiny to something less demanding, he
gave no guidelines for the application of this new standard.' 0 2 Ques-
(No. 89-1836) ("[T]he test applied in this case and the 'serious and imminent
threat' test are both equivalent to the 'clear and present danger' standard.");
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1 at 666 (research notes to Proposed Final Draft of
Rule 3.6 indicate "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" meant to approx-
imate "clear and present danger" test regarding speech and requires case-by-
case inquiry); Matheson, supra note 54, at 917 ("MR 3.6's 'substantial likelihood
of material prejudice' is meant to approximate the clear and present danger for-
mulation."). But see In re Keller, 693 P.2d at 1214 (refusing to imply standard
after noting three possible standard formulations).
98. For a discussion of the lack of distinction, see supra note 97 and accom-
panying text. See also Matheson, supra note 54, at 917 ("clear and present dan-
ger" and "serious and imminent threat" standards were both articulated in
Bridges and have been viewed as substantially indistinguishable).
99. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Gentile (No. 89-
1836). For a prophetic discussion of the "clear and present danger," "serious
and imminent threat" and "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" standards, see
Rotondo, supra note 47, at 1111-18. The author concluded, ten years before
Gentile was decided, that there was no real difference between the standards,
other than their semantic variations. Id. at 1118-19. This is precisely what Jus-
tice Kennedy and three members of the Court stated in Part IB of the majority
opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725; see also In re Keller, 693 P.2d at 1214. In
Keller, the court dismissed the complaint against an attorney for making extraju-
dicial statements. Id. The court refused to imply a standard for review of the
extrajudicial speech when it was unclear how the disciplinary rule should be ap-
plied. Id. Three standards were described: "reasonable likelihood," "serious
and imminent threat" and "clear and present danger." Id. The court recom-
mended that a new rule be drafted. Id.
100. For a discussion of this authority, see supra notes 68-99 and accompa-
nying text.
101. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744-45. For a discussion of this dicta in the
Gentile opinion, see infra notes 129-30 & 157-62 and accompanying text.
102. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. The Court failed to address what must be
established to find an attorney in violation of Rule 3.6 because the new standard
was not applied to Gentile. Id. Because Rule 177 was held unconstitutional on
the grounds of vagueness as applied by Nevada, there was no need for the Court
to apply the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test to the facts in
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tions are left unanswered. Does the government interest in a fair trial
always override attorneys' speech, no matter what the specific circum-
stances of the speech entail? Is it legitimate to impose absolute restric-
tions on attorneys' speech in a form analogous to a "prior restraint"
when less restrictive means are available? How are the interests of the
government, the attorney, the accused, the press and the public to be
balanced?
Although the standards have been built into the professional rules
governing the extrajudicial speech of attorneys, and the rules have had
innumerable revisions, the Gentile case illustrates that much dissent, vari-
ation and confusion in interpretation still exists. Unless the path is bet-
ter illuminated and remaining questions answered, both the right to free
speech and to the fair administration of justice may falter.' 0 3
III. GENTILE V. STATE BAR OF NEVADA
On January 31, 1987, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
reported large quantities of drugs and money missing from a safety de-
posit vault at Western Vault Corporation.' 0 4 The sheriff named several
police officers and Western Vault employees as possible suspects. 10 5
Mr. Gentile's client, Grady Sanders, was the owner of Western Vault
Corporation.' 0 6 The Las Vegas police department had been using the
drugs and money as a part of an undercover operation. 10 7 Although
two police officers and Sanders were initially listed as suspects, the two
officers were "cleared" of any wrongdoing and the investigation shifted
toward vault company employees. 10 8
While the media exonerated the police, 10 9 the news coverage and
Gentile. Id. at 2723, 2731. ChiefJustice Rehnquist in his dissent defended Rule
177 as being constitutionally sound and found Gentile in violation of the Rule,
but the ChiefJustice spoke for only four members of the Court. Id. at 2745-48
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
103. Interview with Dominic P. Gentile, Petitioner in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, and Neil G. Galatz, Esq., representing Mr. Gentile before the State Bar
and Supreme Court of Nevada, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 15, 1991).




108. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gentile (No. 89-1836). The press reported
that the two police suspects had been cleared by police investigation after pass-
ing lie detector tests. Id. at 4. The lie detector tests were administered by an
individual named Ray Slaughter, who subsequently was arrested by the FBI for
distributing cocaine. Id. In addition, press reports indicated that Grady Sanders
had refused to take a police lie detector test. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728.
109. Newspaper articles quoted high police officials stating they had "com-
plete faith and trust" in their officers. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gentile (No. 89-
1836) (synopsis of media coverage). Mr. Gentile, monitoring the preindictment
publicity, was personally aware of at least seventeen articles in major local news-
papers, the Las Vegas Sun and the Las Vegas Review Journal, and numerous
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police investigation became narrowly focused on Sanders as the prime
suspect.'10 Ultimately, Mr. Sanders was indicted."'' Petitioner Do-
minic P. Gentile, a well known and respected criminal defense attorney
in Nevada, held the first press conference of his career shortly after
Sanders' indictment.' 12 Gentile spoke publicly to rebut the "barrage of
local television news stories which reported on Western Vault and the ensuing
investigation. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728.
110. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727-28. For a more detailed accounting of
pre-indictment publicity, see Brief for Petitioner, Joint Appendix, Gentile (No.
89-1836).
111. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Gentile (No. 89-1836).
112. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727-29. Mr. Sanders was indicted on February 5,
1988, on charges of larceny, racketeering and narcotics trafficking. Brief for Pe-
titioner at 6, Gentile (No. 89-1836) (citing Alan Tobin & Warren Bates, Vault
Owner Indicted in Deposit Box Thefts, LAs VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 6, 1988, at IA). The
indictment included a count alleging that Mr. Sanders had stolen narcotics and
travelers' checks, valued at $1.3 million, from the Metro safety deposit box at
Western Vault. Id. The indictment further alleged that Mr. Sanders had stolen
$2 million from other customers of Western Vault. Id.
Mr. Gentile's opening remarks at the press conference held on February 5,
1988 were as follows:
I want to start this off by saying in clear terms that I think that this
indictment is a significant event in the history of the evolution of so-
phistication of the City of Las Vegas, because things of this nature, of
exactly this nature have happened in New York with the French connec-
tion case and in Miami with cases-at least two cases there-have hap-
pened in Chicago as well, but all three of those cities have been honest
enough to indict the people who did it; the police department, crooked'
cops.
When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you're going to see
that the evidence will prove not only that Grady Sanders is an innocent
person and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being
leveled against him, but that the person that was in the most direct
position to have stolen the drugs and money, the American Express
Travelers' checks, is Detective Steve Scholl.
There is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl
took these drugs and took these American Express Travelers' checks
than any other living human being.
And I have to say that I feel that Grady Sanders is being used as a
scapegoat to try to cover up for what has to be obvious to people at Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and at the District Attorney's
office.
Now, with respect to these other charges that are contained in this
indictment, the so-called other victims, as I sit here today I can tell you
that one, two-four of them are known drug dealers and convicted
money launderers and drug dealers; three of whom didn't say a word
about anything until after they were approached by Metro and after
they were already in trouble and are trying to work themselves out of
something.
Now, up until the moment, of course, that they started going along
with what detectives from Metro wanted them to say, these people were
being held out as being incredible and liars by the very same people
who are going to say now that you can believe them.
Another problem that you are going to see develop here is the fact
that of these other counts, at least four of them said nothing about any
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police and prosecution-initiated publicity adverse to [his client]."' 3 Six
months later the criminal case was tried to a jury.' 14 Mr. Sanders was
acquitted on all counts.' 15
Ten months after the press conference, the State Bar of Nevada
filed a complaint against Gentile, alleging that he had violated Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 177 for statements made at the press confer-
ence.1 16 Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 prohibits an attorney from
of this, about anything being missing until after the Law [sic] Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department announced publicly last year their
claim that drugs and American Express Travelers' c[h]ecks were
missing.
Many of the contracts that these people had show on the face of the
contract that there is $100,000 in insurance for the contents of the box.
If you look at the indictment very closely, you're going to see that
these claims fall under $100,000.
Finally, there were only two claims on the face of the indictment
that came to our attention prior to the events of January 31 of '87, that
being the date that Metro said that there was something missing from
their box.
And both of these claims were dealt with by Mr. Sanders and we're
dealing here essentially with people that we're not sure if they ever had
anything in the box. That's about all I have to say.
[Questions from the floor followed.]
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2736-37. For Mr. Gentile's motivation in holding the press
conference, see infra note 113 and accompanying text. See also Gentile, 111 S. Ct.
at 2731 & n.2, 2739 (petitioner's responses to questions from the floor during
press conference).
Mr. Gentile is a Nevada attorney with a national reputation as an advocate,
instructor and leader in bar groups. Mr. Gentile has also authored several arti-
cles about criminal law and procedure, and is a former Associate Dean of the
National College for Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders. Id. at
2728.
113. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Gentile (No. 89-1836). Mr. Gentile "did not
blunder into a press conference but acted with considerable deliberation." Gen-
tile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728. Mr. Gentile had been personally aware of at least 17
newspaper articles in major Las Vegas papers and numerous television stories
over the prior 11 months that had released information which would potentially
poison a jury venire. Id. These stories contained reports of polygraph tests and
information that the police were no longer suspects. Id. Mr. Gentile was also
concerned because the preindictment investigation had "taken a serious toll" on
his client. Id. Grady Sanders was not in good health-he had undergone multi-
ple open-heart surgeries prior to these events and the suspicion of wrongdoing
had forced Western Vault to close. Id. Prior to his press statement, Mr. Gentile
carefully researched an attorney's obligations under Nevada Supreme Court
Rule 177. Id. at 2729. Mr. Gentile concluded that because the court had set a
trial date for some six months hence, the content of his proposed statement
would not be "substantially likely to result in material prejudice." Id.
114. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2729-30.
115. Id. at 2730-3 1. "The trial judge questioned the jury venire about pub-
licity." Id. at 2730. Although many jurors had vague recollections about reports
of cocaine missing from Western Vault and a police coverup, and one juror
remembered that the police had been cleared from suspicion, not a single juror
remembered the petitioner, Mr. Gentile, or his press conference. Id.
116. Brief for Petitioner, Joint Appendix at 10, Gentile (No. 89-1836).
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making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would ex-
pect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."' I7 The
Rule lists a number of statements that ordinarily would result in material
prejudice, and would therefore violate the ethical obligation imposed by
the Rule." 18 Also, the Rule contains a "safe harbor" provision enumer-
ating comments that an attorney may make without fear of violating the
rule.' 19
Following a hearing, the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the
117. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. Sup. Ct. Rule 177 (Michie 1991).
118. Id. According to Rule 177, statements which will likely result in mate-
rial prejudice relate to:
(a) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a
witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(b) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or
contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defend-
ant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(c) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the
identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(d) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or sus-
pect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;'
(e) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is.
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed'
create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(f) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is
merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until
and unless proven guilty.
Id.
119. Id. The "safe harbor" provisions of Rule 177 include:
Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-0, a lawyer involved in the
investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(a) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(b) the information contained in a public record;
(c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense in-
volved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons
involved;
(d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood
of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(g) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information nec-
essary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
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State Bar found that in making his statements at the February 5, 1988
press conference, Mr. Gentile violated Rule 177.120 The Board recom-
mended a private reprimand. 12 1 Mr. Gentile appealed the Board's deci-
sion to the Nevada Supreme Court, thereby waiving the confidentiality
of the disciplinary proceeding.' 2 2 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Disciplinary Board.' 2 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and in a disparate five-four decision, reversed
the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court. 124
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 12 5 the Court held that Nevada's ap-
plication of Rule 177 violated the First Amendment on the grounds of
vagueness. 12 6 The five-member majority believed that the safe harbor
provision's ambiguous grammatical structure, "absent any clarifying in-
terpretation" by state courts, failed to "provide fair notice" to Mr. Gen-
tile. Therefore, the Court held that Rule 177, as applied to Mr. Gentile,
was void for vagueness. 12 7
A different five-member consensus of the Court endorsed a discus-
sion extending beyond the scope of the holding. 128 In dicta, Chief Jus-
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and the length of the investigation.
Id.
120. Brief for Petitioner, Joint Appendix at 5, Gentile (No. 89-1836).
121. Id.
122. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Gentile (No. 89-1836).
123. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 787 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Nev. 1990), cert.
granted, Ill S. Ct. 669 (1991), rev'd, I llS. Ct. 2720 (1991).
124. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2736.
125. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). Justice Kennedy announced the holding of
the case in Parts III and VI of his opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, Stevens and O'Connor. Parts I, II, IV and V ofJustice Kennedy's opinion
were joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens only. Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in dicta with respect to Parts I and
II of his opinion, with Justices White, Scalia, O'Connor and Souter joining.
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in Part III of his opinion in
which Justices White, Scalia and Souterjoined. Justice O'Connor filed a concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 2723.
126. Id. at 2723, 2731. The Rule's safe harbor provision, Rule 177(3), mis-
led Mr. Gentile into thinking he could make statements at the press conference
without violating the Rule's restrictions. Id. at 2723, 2731. For the text of Ne-
vada's disciplinary rule, see supra text accompanying note 117 and notes 118-19.
127. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731. The four members of the Court who joined
Justice Kennedy in the holding were Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens and Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2723.
128. Id. at 2744. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Souter joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist in this part of the opinion. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, objected to the five-member Supreme Court
conclusion that review of attorney speech can be regulated under a more defer-
ential standard. Id. at 2732. Justice Kennedy stated:
We have not in recent years accepted our colleagues' apparent theory
that the practice of law brings with it comprehensive restrictions, or
that we will defer to professional bodies when those restrictions im-
pinge upon First Amendment freedoms. And none of the justifications
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tice Rehnquist, writing for this five-member consensus, stated that the
speech of attorneys participating in pending litigation may be regulated
under a "less demanding" standard than that used to regulate the
press.' 29 These members agreed that, while the more stringent stan-
dard of "clear and present danger" is appropriate in First Amendment
analysis reviewing restrictions of speech for the press and third parties,
the less demanding "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" stan-
dard can constitutionally be applied to lawyers involved in pending
litigation. 130
This Note proposes a revision of Model Rule 3.6 premised on the
logic that if Nevada's interpretation of the Rule violated the First
Amendment, then thirty-one other states using Model Rule 3.6 can also
be ensnared.' 3 ' The Gentile Court concluded that Nevada's interpreta-
put forward by respondent suffice to sanction abandonment of our nor-
mal First Amendment principles in the case of speech by an attorney
regarding pending cases.
Id. at 2734.
129. Id. at 2744. The standard defined as appropriate for review of press
activity was established by the Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976). The Court used Judge Learned Hand's formulation of "clear and
present danger"-the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability must
justify such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger-and
applied it to prior restraint of the press. Id. at 562. In Nebraska Press, the Court
reversed an order imposing prior restraint on the news media to prevent publi-
cation or broadcast of facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely
publicized murder case. Id. at 543-45. The Court stated that while "the guaran-
tees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circum-
stances .... the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption
against its use continues intact." Id. at 570. This "barrier" protecting the free-
dom of the press is much more formidable than the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard used to limit an attorney's speech. Gentile, 111 S.
Ct. at 2741. Although no prior restraints were involved in the Gentile decision,
Chief Justice Rehnquist made the comparison between Nebraska Press and Gentile
because Mr. Gentile asserted the Nebraska Press standard should be used for at-
torneys. Id. at 2740. Mr. Gentile likened the prohibitive sections of Rule 3.6 to
the "chilling effect" of prior restraints.
130. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742-45. For a discussion of the difference be-
tween these standards, see In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211, 1212-14 (Mont. 1984).
The Supreme Court of Montana held that although it had the power to imply a
standard for disciplinary rules governing the extrajudicial speech of attorneys, it
would not do so as a matter of policy because implied standards give no gui-
dance to attorneys. Id. at 1214. After identifying three possible standards for
disciplinary rules-"clear and present danger," "reasonable likelihood to inter-
fere with a fair trial" and "serious and imminent threat"-the court decided the
standard should be considered anew and another disciplinary rule drafted. Id.
131. Although Justice Kennedy and four members of the Court held that
Nevada's Rule 177 was void for vagueness as applied, it is clear from the Court's
opinion that the holding is limited to Nevada's application of the Rule under the
facts of this case and does not invalidate ABA Rule 3.6 as unconstitutional. Gen-
tile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, joined by four members of the
Court in Part II of his opinion, discussed the fact that 31 states, in addition to
Nevada, have adopted ABA Rule 3.6. Id. at 2741. In this part of the opinion,
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tion of Rule 177 created a "trap for the wary as well as the unwary";
however, the Court failed to provide instruction on how to avoid the
"trap" short of relying on a judicial determination. 132 A revision of the
Rule could facilitate interpretation, provide direction and help rescue
attorneys from the vagueness "trap."
A. The Void For Vagueness Holding
A five-member majority of the Supreme Court held that Rule 177,
as interpreted by Nevada courts, was void for vagueness because the
Rule's "grammatical structure ...absent any clarifying interpretation by the
state court .... fails to provide 'fair notice to those to whom [it] is di-
rected.' "1'33 The Court focused on one of the Rule's safe harbor provi-
sions, Rule 177(3)(a), which provides that statements of a "general
nature" made about the defense of a case, "without elaboration," are
permissible "notwithstanding" the speech specifically prohibited in sub-
sections (1) and (2).'34 The Court believed that the use of the word
"notwithstanding" in the grammatical structure of the Rule causes an
attorney to think that the prohibitions set out earlier in the Rule can be
disregarded. 135 The Court explained that the grammatical structure of this
provision, absent any clarifying interpretation by the state courts, gives a law-
yer no notice of when his or her remarks "pass from the safe harbor of
the general into the forbidden sea of the elaborated."'13 6 As Justice
Kennedy pointed out, Mr. Gentile was found in violation of the Rule
ChiefJustice Rehnquist endorsed the constitutionality of the "substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice" standard. Id. at 2745. Part II traces the evolution of
the "clear and present danger" standard relative to the First Amendment and
generally addresses ethical restrictions on lawyers' extrajudicial speech. Id. at
2740-45. The content of ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion strongly implies that
more than just Nevada's Rule 177 is at stake. See STONE ET AL., supra note 67, at
32-33, 48-51 (casebook focuses on Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion teaching
that Gentile stands for broad proposition that lawyers' speech may be held to
more restrictive First Amendment standard).
132. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732.
133. Id. at 2731 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112
(1972)) (emphasis added).
134. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. Sup. Ct. Rules 177 (Michie 1991). Rule
177(3)(a) states in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding subsection I and 2(a-f), a law-
yer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elabora-
tion .. .the general nature of the claim or defense." Id. (emphasis added). Rule
177(1) states a "lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement... if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. Rule 177(2) delineates
the areas of prohibited speech. For the pertinent text of Rule 177, see supra note
118. For the pertinent text of Rule 3.6 see supra note 2.
135. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731. Although the word "notwithstanding" may
cause confusion as to where lines should be drawn, it is unlikely that an attorney
will violate any prohibition in the Rule that is clearly set forth. The real problem
is not the word "notwithstanding," but rather clearly delineating the "safe
harbors" separately from the prohibited speech.
136. Id. at 2731.
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even after making a "conscious effort at compliance." 137 The combina-
tion of ambiguous grammatical structure and lack of judicial interpreta-
tion left the Rule prey to vagueness, misinterpretation and selective
enforcement.' 3 8
The majority, in reaching its void for vagueness holding, considered
the political nature of Gentile's speech criticizing the Las Vegas Police
Department. 13 9 Political speech, which criticizes government and its of-
ficials, lies at the heart of the First Amendment. It safeguards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and
the judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. 140 Jus-
tice Kennedy, speaking for five members of the Court, stated that it was
the professional mission of the criminal defense bar to challenge actions
of the State. 141 Only four members of the Court, however, believed that
the issue of political speech dominated the constitutional analysis in
Gentile's case. 142
Although the Court emphasized that it was merely holding Nevada's
interpretation of Rule 177 void for vagueness, the Court, in effect, held
that Model Rule 3.6 itself is void for vagueness as evidenced by Nevada's
erroneous interpretation. 14 3 According to the Supreme Court, Nevada
137. Id. at 2732. Justice O'Connor, the fifth concurring vote in the Court's
holding, pointed out that "[b]oth Gentile and the disciplinary board have valid
arguments on their side, but this serves to support the view that the rule pro-
vides insufficient guidance." Id. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor, in addition to writing separately, joined Justice Kennedy in Part III of
his opinion (void for vagueness holding) and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Parts I and II of his opinion ("substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
dicta). Id. at 2748-49.
138. Id. at 2724.
139. Id. "[T]his case involves classic political speech.... At issue here is
the constitutionality of a ban on political speech critical of the government and
its officials." Id. There was a real possibility of police misconduct in the Gentile
case, since the stolen cocaine and money deposited at Western Vault belonged
to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. For a discussion of the facts
of Gentile, see supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text. "The media and the
public were interested to know whether police officers were involved in the
thefts, or whether Mr. Sanders or others were responsible." Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the State of Nevada at 5, Gentile (No. 90-1836).
140. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2724-25 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 350 (1966)).
141. Id. at 2732.
142. Id. at 2724, 2732. Part I of Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, emphasized the political speech aspect of
Gentile. Id. at 2724-26. Part III, encompassing the Court's void for vagueness
holding, also referred to political speech. Id. at 2732.
143. Although the void for vagueness holding is qualified by Justice Ken-
nedy in that he believed the Rule itself was not flawed if interpreted in a proper
and narrow manner-apparently that was difficult to do. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at
2725. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-10 (1972), explained that if the Court were left to "just the
words of the ordinance," the Court may have been troubled by imprecision in
the wording. Id. at 111. The implication was that without the Court's "extrapo-
1992] NOTE 645
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had difficulty interpreting the Rule. 144 Presumably, if the Rule itself
were easy to interpret, Mr. Gentile, the State Bar of Nevada, the Nevada
Supreme Court and all the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
would have been in agreement.14 5 Justice O'Connor makes this point in
her concurring opinion. 146 Whether Rule 177 is vague as interpreted or
vague as written, the same "evils" inhere. 14 7 Lack of notice, discrimina-
tory enforcement and unnecessary restraint on freedom of speech result
from both vague law and vague interpretations of such law.14 8
Because Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is identical to Model Rule
3.6, the void for vagueness holding has broad implications. 149 If the
lation" of "allowable meaning" using text, interpretations of the court below
and interpretations of those enforcing the statute, the ordinance, as written, pro-
vided insufficient guidance. Id. at 110-12. There appears to be a fine line be-
tween an unconstitutionally vague statute and an unconstitutionally vague
interpretation-the difference being whether a court has a legitimate basis to
"extrapolate" on the meaning of the language.
144. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723, 2731-32.
145. The difference of opinion between Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist as to whether the content of Dominic Gentile's statements did or did
not violate Rule 177 is striking. Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens believed that Gentile's statements to the press were appropriate because he
disclosed no evidence from searches or test results, confessions or elaborations.
Id. at 2730. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter and White be-
lieved that "[n]o sensible person could think that [Gentile's statements] were
'general' statements of a claim or defense made 'without elaboration.' " Id. at
2747 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This disparity indicated "the rule provides
insufficient guidance." Id. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that
both Gentile and the Nevada Disciplinary Board had valid arguments, which
served to support the view that the Rule provides insufficient guidance. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court denounced the evils of vague
laws:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend
several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly dele-
gates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a
vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms."
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked.
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted).
148. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Part II of his opinion that
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Supreme Court of Nevada and the State Bar of Nevada cannot properly
interpret the Rule, and the United States Supreme Court can do so only
in a five-four decision, then a real possibility exists that the thirty-one
other states which have adopted Model Rule 3.6 will have substantially
the same difficulty. 150
Because only five members of the Court endorsed the void for
vagueness holding, and because much of Justice Kennedy's opinion rep-
resented the views of only four members of the Court, the Gentile hold-
ing remains ripe for controversy. This lack of unity undermines the
Court's holding and vitiates the Rule's attempt to provide guidance to
attorneys who seek to speak in the "court of public opinion."
B. The "Substantial Likelihood of Material Prejudice" Standard
A lack of consensus also existed among members of the Gentile
Court as to the proper interpretation of the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard.151 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and four mem-
"[c]urrently, 31 States in addition to Nevada have adopted- either verbatim or
with insignificant variation-Rule 3.6 of the ABA's Model Rules." Id. at 2741.
Justice Kennedy states, however, that the matter before the Court "does not
call into question the constitutionality of other States' prohibitions upon an at-
torney's speech that will have a 'substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding,' but is limited to Nevada's interpretation of that
standard." Id. at 2724.
150. Since its adoption in 1983 there has been very little adjudication in-
volving ABA Model Rule 3.6. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983) (court used verbiage of ABA Rule 3.6 in part to deter-
mine that restraining order was overbroad), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
Prior to the adoption of Model Rule 3.6, there were only five challenges to the
authority of the legal profession to discipline an attorney for improper publicity.
See Swift, supra note 7, at 1047-49 n.298. All five cases dealt with DR 7-107 of
the original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. See generally In re Sawyer, 360
U.S. 622 (1959); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976); In re Keller, 693 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984); Markfield v. Association of
the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), appeal dismissed, 375 N.Y.S.2d
106 (N.Y. 1975). Gentile is the first and only example of an attorney challenging
the interpretation of ABA Model Rule 3.6. It is noteworthy that this first case
ended up in the Supreme Court of the United States. The lack of cases does not
signify a lack of problems with interpretation, but rather is evidence of the po-
tential deterrent effect resulting from the vagueness of the rule (i.e., attorneys
are chary to invoke the inconsistent and ambiguous "safe harbor" provision).
See Swift, supra note 7, at 1029 ("the 'chilling effect' of professional sanctions...
is a consequence which lawyers would be loathe to risk").
151. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723, 2725, 2740-45. The five-four split in dicta
serves to undermine the already weak five-four holding of a different majority of
the Court. The uncertain value of the dicta, coupled with the disparity of opin-
ion regarding the "substantial likelihood" standard, obscured what should have
been a standard approach to Model Rule 3.6.
Parts IV and V ofJustice Kennedy's opinion are dicta relating to the appro-
priate standard for balancing First Amendment rights (freedom of speech)
against governmental interests. Id. at 2732-36. Justice Kennedy, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in Part IV of his opinion, objected to the
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hers of the Court believed that the speech of lawyers representing cli-
ents in pending cases may generally be regulated under a less
demanding standard than "clear and present danger."' 52 Justice Ken-
nedy and three members of the Court explicitly objected to ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's conclusion, contending that lawyer speech is subject to
greater restrictions only when certain justifications exist. 15 3
The "clear and present danger" standard, in its various forms, has
historically been used to regulate the press and the speech of ordinary
citizens. 154 Mr. Gentile argued that the same standard should be ap-
plied to the extrajudicial speech of attorneys. ' 5 5 The Nevada State Bar,
however, distinguishing the decisions relied on by Mr. Gentile as not
involving lawyers representing parties to pending litigation, advocated
that a less demanding standard would be employed. 156 Chief Justice
Rehnquist used these opposing views to frame the issue addressed in the
dicta of Gentile: "whether a lawyer who represents a defendant involved
with the criminal justice system may insist on the same standard before
he is disciplined for public pronouncements about the case, or whether
the State instead may penalize that sort of speech upon a lesser
showing."' 5 7
majority's conclusion that "Nevada may interpret its requirement of substantial
likelihood of material prejudice under a standard more deferential than is the
usual rule where speech is concerned." Id. at 2732. Part II of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Sourer, White and O'Connor,
comprised the majority for the discussion in dicta which sanctioned the constitu-
tionality of the more restrictive "substantial likelihood" standard for attorneys.
Id. at 2740-45.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2733. In support of his objections, Justice Kennedy distin-
guishes the cases relied on by ChiefJustice Rehnquist as either involving com-
mercial speech by attorneys or information that attorneys could access only
through discovery. Id. Justice Kennedy explains that neither of those circum-
stances or underlying interests were implicated in the Gentile case. Id.
154. Swift, supra note 7, at 1014-15. Freedom of access by the press must
meet the "most stringent of the modern constitutional tests, 'strict scrutiny.' "
Id. at 1015. In establishing this standard the Court has held "[w]here ... the
State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a com-
pelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id.
(citing Globe News Paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)). For fur-
ther discussion of the "clear and present danger" standard, see supra notes 70-
83 and accompanying text.
155. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2740-42. Gentile relied on the "clear and present
danger" standard as set forth by the Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976), Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). Gentile, 111
S. Ct. at 2742. In these cases, the Court held that courts could not use their
contempt power to punish the press unless there was a "clear and present dan-
ger" of actual prejudice or imminent threat to the fair administration ofjustice.
Id.
156. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742.
157. Id. at 2743.
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According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard employed by Rule 3.6 requires a lesser
showing by the State and can be used to limit lawyer comments that are
likely to influence the outcome of a trial.' 5 8 The restriction of a lawyer's
extrajudicial speech, when involved in pending litigation, is constitu-
tional even if there is no actual prejudice or harm. 15 9 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's five-member consensus distinguished the standard used to
regulate lawyers' speech from that used to regulate the speech of the
general public, because as officers of the court, lawyers are subject to
ethical restrictions on speech, whereas ordinary citizens and the press
are not. 160 Because of this distinction, and his belief that Rule 3.6 was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish its objective,' 6 1 ChiefJustice
Rehnquist concluded that Rule 177's "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard is not violative of the constitutional mandates of the
First Amendment. 16 2
In contrast, Justice Kennedy and three other Justices believed that
the critical concern was to assess the proximity and degree of harm, re-
gardless of how the standard is worded. 163 Justice Kennedy acknowledged
that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard could
prove to be the semantic equivalent of the "clear and present danger"
standard, 164 and because each standard requires an assessment of prox-
158. Id. at 2745. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "the 'substantial
likelihood' test embodied in Rule 177 is constitutional" and limits two evils:
"(1) comments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and
(2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can
ultimately be found." Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 2743.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2745. "[Rule 177] is designed to protect the integrity and fair-
ness of a state's judicial system and impose only narrow and necessary limita-
tions on lawyers speech." Id.
162. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's five-member consensus concluded:
The regulation of attorneys' speech is limited-it applies only to speech
that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is
neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participat-
ing in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorney's comments
until after the trial. While supported by the substantial state interest in
preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a
duty to protect its integrity, the rule is limited on its face to preventing
only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
that proceeding.
Id.
163. See id. at 2732-34; see also Rotondo, supra note 47, at 1106, 1118 (refer-
ring to historical development of standards and illustrating Justice Kennedy's
point that difference in standards is merely one of semantics).
164. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725. Justice Kennedy noted that the drafters of
Model Rule 3.6 apparently thought "the substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice formulation approximated the clear and present danger test," because both
standards focused on the likelihood of injury and its substantiality. Id. Justice
Kennedy and his group also contended that a lower standard of scrutiny is less
appropriate, particularly when applied to a defense attorney. Id. at 2725, 2734-
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imity and degree of harm, each may be capable of valid interpreta-
tion. 16 5 When the proximity and degree of harm were assessed in this
case, and used in balancing the State's interest in an unprejudiced trial
against Gentile's First Amendment freedom of speech, Justice Kennedy
opined that Rule 177, as interpreted by Nevada, failed to pass constitu-
tional muster. 16 6 Rule 177, as applied to Mr. Gentile, limited First
Amendment freedoms greater than was necessary or essential to protect
the government's interests. 16 7 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy con-
tended that this case was a poor vehicle to define the outer limits of a
court's ability to constitutionally restrict an attorney's extrajudicial
statements. 1
6 8
The five-four votes tallying the holding and dicta in Gentile are tenu-
ous and give little guidance. 169 Although the Court set down the consti-
tutional standard to be used, it failed to apply the standard to Gentile's
speech.170 In light of the conflicting First Amendment approaches and
35. Justice Kennedy pointed to the empirical research showing a lack of correla-
tion between exposure to pretrial publicity and actual prejudice at trial. Id. at
2734. Justice Kennedy also pointed to the lack of anecdotal evidence showing
that a defense attorney has ever managed to prejudice the prosecution's case.
Id. Justice Kennedy emphasized that in many of the various committee reports
which resulted in the promulgation of the ABA's Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.6, there was no convincing case presented for restrictions on defense
attorneys. Id. at 2735; see also Swift, supra note 7, at 1031-49.
165. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725.
166. Id. at 2734.
167. Id. at 2732-36. Justice Kennedy did not specifically mention what stan-
dard should be used, but stated that the Rule in this case "does not protect
against a danger of the necessary gravity, imminence, or likelihood." Id. at
2736.
168. Id. at 2736.
169. The major philosophical split in how each five-member group ofJus-
tices approached First Amendment rights is noteworthy. On one hand, Justice
Kennedy, writing for Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor, held
that Rule 177 (Model Rule 3.6) was ambiguous as written. Id. at 2731. This
same group, with the exception of Justice O'Connor, believed that "substantial
likelihood" is no different than "clear and present danger." Id. at 2724-25. This
approach tends to favor First Amendment rights of attorneys, using a strict scru-
tiny test and minimizing the restrictions placed on speech.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for Justices White,
Scalia and Souter, believed that Rule 177 (Model Rule 3.6) was unambiguously
drafted, and, along with Justice O'Connor, that the less demanding "substantial
likelihood" standard can constitutionally restrict an attorney's extrajudicial
speech. Id. at 2738-48. This approach tends to shrink an attorney's First
Amendment rights, using an intermediate level of scrutiny and maximizing the
restrictions placed on speech.
Justice O'Connor, joining both groups, seems to straddle the fence between
these two opposing First Amendment philosophies.
170. Justice O'Connor joined ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion condoning
the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard, and she also joined
Justice Kennedy's opinion in the void for vagueness holding. Id. at 2748-49
(O'Connor, J., concurring). This switch effectively precluded the Court from
applying its new constitutional standard to the facts of Gentile. Id. at 2723.
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close voting by the Court, the Gentile opinion begs the question, exactly
how should attorneys interpret Model Rule 3.6?
IV. PROPOSED REVISION OF MODEL RULE 3.6
A. Justification
There are two justifications for revising ABA Model Rule 3.6. The
first justification would be to assist other states. Because Nevada's inter-
pretation of the Rule was held to be unconstitutionally vague, other
states will likely misinterpret the Rule's ambiguous language. 17 1 Sec-
ond, the "substantial likelihood" standard is confusing. Not only is it
unclear how "substantial likelihood" differs from "clear and present
danger," but the use of two different standards--one for attorneys and
one for the press and the public in general-can create a bias against
attorneys restricted by Model Rule 3.6.172
The thirty-two states that have enacted Model Rule 3.6 will be look-
ing to the Gentile decision for guidance and definition. Unfortunately,
the void for vagueness holding and the "substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice" dicta in Gentile do little more than alert attorneys to the
fact that Model Rule 3.6 should be consulted with caution. Short of bur-
dening the judicial system each time Model Rule 3.6 is invoked, the effi-
cient and logical remedy is to revise the Rule.
B. A Revised Rule of Professional Conduct Governing Extrajudicial
Speech of Attorneys
To provide the best possible solution, a rule restricting speech of
attorneys must balance all relevant interests and it must be precise.173
171. Although Justice Kennedy stated that the issue before the Court was
limited to Nevada's interpretation and application of the Rule, the ambiguity
and grammatical concerns identified by the Court are still present in Model Rule
3.6. Id. at 2725, 2731.
172. The Supreme Court has described attorneys as "officer[s] of the
court" to distinguish them from ordinary citizens. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S.
622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (reversing sanction imposed on at-
torney for comments made outside courtroom alleging judicial unfairness). In
Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court stated that "[n]either prosecutors, counsel for de-
fense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (emphasis added). The Sheppard Court also
warned that "there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting .... " Id.
at 362-63. This combination, restricting those under the jurisdiction of the
courts while not restricting the media, sets up a double standard creating bias
against a defendant without a media spokesperson. In Gentile, the Court admit-
ted that only the speech "of those participating before the courts could be limited,"
and that Rule 177 did not apply to third parties. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743 & n.5.
173. Professor Swift suggested that a proposed rule must satisfy three re-
quirements: "precision of regulation, empirically demonstrable relationship,
and less restrictive alternative." Swift, supra note 7, at 1028. Stating that Model
Rule 3.6 simply does not satisfy these requirements, Professor Swift offered an
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The government's interest in promoting the fair administration of jus-
tice must be balanced against the attorney's First Amendment interest in
free speech. Interests of the accused, the press and the public must also
be considered. 174 The balancing analysis can be facilitated by clarifying
the definition of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" stan-
dard. Precision can be achieved by changing the grammatical construc-
tion and elaborating on the safe harbor provisions of the current
Rule. 17 5 The goal of these revisions is to disperse the uncertainty sur-
rounding Model Rule 3.6 that remains after the Gentile decision. 176
1. The Void for Vagueness Problem
The vagueness problem of Model Rule 3.6 can be cured by revising
alternative: "a specifically tailored judicial order prohibiting proscribed public-
ity." Id. at 1051; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (" 'Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect,' and . . . '[p]recision of regula-
tion must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms.'" (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))). Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that
"there is a place and need for specific provisions in properly drawn rules"), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
Courts, for years, have attempted to accommodate the First Amendment
right of free speech and the right to a fair trial with a balancing approach. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("[T]he
test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude
of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then to balance the
character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfet-
tered expression." (emphasis added)); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336
(1946) ("[R]eviewing courts are brought in cases ... to appraise the comment
on a balance between the desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair
adjudication, free from interruptions of its processes." (emphasis added)); see
also Rotondo, supra note 47, at 1120 (proposing that fair trial rights have no
priority over free speech rights and courts have already been using balancing
approach as reasons which supported using factors in a "balancing test" ap-
proach to Disciplinary Rule 7-107).
The Court in Nebraska Press used Judge Learned Hand's balancing test,
which weighed "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
[against the] invasion of free speech . . . [needed] to avoid the danger." Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). The Court then ex-
amined the evidence with more precision, reviewing: 1) the nature and extent
of pretrial publicity, 2) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the
effects of pretrial publicity, and 3) how effectively restraining speech would pre-
vent the threatened danger. Id.
174. Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1967), appeal after
remand, 409 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969).
175. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's opinion related to the ambigu-
ous grammatical construction issue, see supra notes 133-50 and accompanying
text. Currently, subsection (c)(3) of Model Rule 3.6 is the "safe harbor" provi-
sion. It is this same section in Nevada's Rule 177 which gave Mr. Gentile diffi-
culty in determining what was permissible speech. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731-32.
176. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731 (discussing ambiguous structure of
Rule).
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the ambiguous grammatical structure that was identified in Gentile.177
Two new "safe harbor" provisions relating to the public interest and a
"right of reply" should be added to give further guidance. "Remedial
measures" for the attorney to consider prior to speaking extrajudicially
should also be delineated. 178 These changes can be implemented by
revising Section (c) of Rule 3.6 as it is currently written and by adding a
Section (d). The revised text should read as follows:
(c) Consistent with Sections (a) and (b) (1-6), 179 a lawyer involved
in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state:
(1) the nature of the claim or defense; [Sections (c)(2-7)
should remain as written]1 80
(d) The following safe harbor provisions apply to a lawyer in-
volved in the investigation or litigation of a matter:
(1) If a lawyer knows or has reason to know that danger to
a public interest exists, the lawyer may disclose, in good
faith, any information by means of public communication
reasonably believed necessary to prevent harm to the pub-
lic interest.' 8 ' Disclosure of information reasonably be-
lieved necessary to protect the public interest may be made
notwithstanding the restrictions on speech set forth in sec-
tions (a) and (b)(1-6) of this Rule. 182
177. For a discussion of grammatical issues, see supra notes 133-50 and ac-
companying text.
178. The "safe harbor" provisions permit an attorney to exercise his or her
freedom of speech outside the courtroom under specific circumstances. The re-
medial measures serve two purposes: first, they should be considered by the
attorney as an alternative to a "right of reply," and second, if needed, they
should be invoked by the courts to "cure" potential prejudicial effects of pretrial
publicity.
179. Whether Sections (b)(1-6) of Rule 3.6 create evidentiary "presump-
tions" is disputed. See Matheson, supra note 54, at 919; HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 1, at 666. Professor Matheson suggests that if the list of prohibited speech
in Rule 3.6 rises to the level of an evidentiary presumption, there may be diffi-
culty in rebutting those "presumptions" because of the speculative nature of the
determination. See Matheson, supra note 54, at 919. Whether Sections (b)(l-6)
should be considered as evidentiary presumptions or merely as guidelines for
attorneys is beyond the scope of this Note. These sections are not changed as
part of the proposed revision of Rule 3.6.
180. For the language of the existing Rule 3.6, see supra note 2.
181. Although harm to the public interest is referred to in subsection (c)(6)
of Model Rule 3.6 as currently written, the harm involved must emanate from
"danger concerning the behavior of a person involved." For the text of subsec-
tion (c)(6), see supra note 2. This language implies that only harm from danger-
ous, criminal-type behavior may be forewarned. The new "safe harbor"
provision, subsection (d)(1), is broader, focusing on the need to forewarn of
harm to the public interest, whether caused by dangerous criminal-type behavior
or governmental corruption. For an extended discussion of other sources of
danger to the public interest, see infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
182. This section as written is consistent with ABA Rule 1.6 "Confidential-
ity of Information." Rule 1.6 states in part:
NOTE
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(2) A lawyer may, in good faith, to protect his client from
substantial economic, physical or emotional harm, or pub-
lic stigmatization, make an extrajudicial statement dissemi-
nated by means of public communication to counter pre-
existing adverse publicity ("right of reply"). In doing so,
the lawyer may:
(i) make any statement that comports with subsection
(c)(1-7) of this Rule; and
(ii) make statements pertaining to evidence the lawyer
knows is likely to be admissible and proper argument
necessary to counter preexisting adverse publicity.
The information disclosed must not:
(i) violate paragraphs (b)(2-6);
(ii) relate to the criminal record of a party, suspect in
a criminal investigation or witness or identity of a
witness;
(iii) be released within six months of jury selection
without an order of the court; and
(iv) be released in a community with a population that
would prohibit the selection of impartial jurors during
a reasonably extensive voir dire.
The following Comment to Section (d) should be provided:
A balancing approach must be used by the attorney seeking to
make an extrajudicial statement under Model Rule 3.6. The in-
terests of the public, the parties, and the State must be bal-
anced against the attorney's decision to speak. The attorney
must also consider the availability and potential effectiveness of
judicial remedies (prior restraints, change of venue, continu-
ance, jury instruction and sequestration) and voir dire as alterna-
tives to extrajudicial speech.
a. The Grammatical Structure
The grammatical ambiguity has been resolved by replacing
"notwithstanding" with "consistent with" in Section (c) of the Rule.' 8 '
[A] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation . . . except . . . [a] lawyer
may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (emphasis added).
In the case of a lawyer invoking Rule 3.6, either the lawyer will have the
client's consent to disclose information, or the information involved will not be
related to the client's representation, but to the adverse party.
183. The use of the word "notwithstanding" in the "safe harbor" provi-
sion, subsection (c) of the original Rule, implies that an attorney can disregard
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The phrase "without elaboration" in Section (c) has been deleted be-
cause it is ambiguous. The word "general" in Section (c)(1) has been
deleted and replaced with a "consistent with" phrase referring to speech
prohibited in Section (b)(1-6). These changes specifically address the
objectional language referred to in Gentile and lend more precision to
the Rule. 18
4
b. The Safe Harbor Provisions
The two new "safe harbor" provisions are set forth in Section (d).
The first and most important "safe harbor," added at Subsection (d)(1),
shields an attorney from restraints on speech when a public interest is at
stake. 18 5 In Pennekamp v. Florida,'8 6 the Supreme Court stated:
Discussion that follows the termination of a case may be inade-
quate to emphasize the danger to public welfare. . . . In the
borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side
the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public
comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases.' 8 7
Whether the public interest involves judicial impropriety as in Penne-
kamp, or the possibility of police corruption as in Gentile, or another
"danger to the public welfare," an attorney with knowledge of the "dan-
ger" must be afforded the opportunity to speak without threat of disci-
plinary action. 1 88 The attorney's speech under these circumstances
the guidelines for prohibited speech in subsections (a) and (b). For the text of
Rule 3.6, see supra note 2. Replacing "notwithstanding" with "consistent with"
lets the attorney know that the safe harbors may not be invoked at the expense
of the prohibited speech.
184. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991) (dis-
cussing objectional language).
185. For a discussion of political speech as a public interest factor in the
Gentile Court's holding, see supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
186. 328 U.S. 331, 349-50 (1946) (holding newspaper editorials criticizing
judicial process in pending litigation did not present clear and present danger to
fair administration of justice).
187. Id. at 346-47; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 838 (1978) ("A major purpose of [the First] Amendment [is] to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs." (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966))); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("The press
... guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecu-
tors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.").
188. According to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(b)(1), an attorney, despite the mandate not to breach client confidentiality,
may reveal information reasonably believed necessary "to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Speaking out to prevent danger to the public welfare is a
comparable justification. Even outside the context of criminal litigation, there
may be a need to disclose information. For example, during the pretrial investi-
gation of the MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas in November of 1980, Neil G.
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should be accorded full First Amendment protection.' 89
The second "safe harbor" provision, added at Subsection (d)(2),
aims at countering the bias created by Model Rule 3.6. Assuming that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard is proper, bias is created when a less demanding
standard is applied to attorneys. 190 This bias is most apparent in cases
of criminal prosecution.191 "The police, the prosecution, other govern-
ment officials, and the community at large hold innumerable avenues for
the dissemination of information adverse to a criminal defendant" which
are not restricted by professional rules governing pretrial publicity.
19 2
Because "a defendant cannot speak without fear of incriminating himself
and prejudicing his defense, and most criminal defendants have insuffi-
cient means to retain a public relations team ... [to counter] prosecu-
tion statements," the accused is at a severe disadvantage.1 9 3 The
defense attorney may be the only individual able to speak on behalf of
his client. If the defense attorney cannot address issues that the prose-
cution addresses through "other avenues," bias exists and the fair ad-
Galatz, attorney for plaintiffs, discovered there had been numerous fire code
violations. Mr. Galatz, although not officially sanctioned, was directed in confer-
ence not to disclose information that would prejudice the pending trial. Subse-
quently, in February 1981, the Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas burned. Similar fire
code violations were discovered. When Mr. Galatz tried to disclose this informa-
tion on behalf of the public interest, he was sanctioned in the amount of
$10,000. The sanction was ultimately lifted. Telephone Interview with Neil G.
Galatz, Esq. (Oct. 15, 1991).
189. For a discussion of Gentile's interpretation of Rule 3.6 as allowing him
First Amendment protection, see supra note 126 and accompanying text. Even
though Gentile's speech was ultimately given First Amendment protection, this
change in the Rule is advocated because of the uncertainty in the Gentile holding.
For a discussion of this uncertainty, see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying
text.
190. Model Rule 3.6 applies only to lawyers, prosecution and defense alike.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1983). Professor Swift gave
three reasons why applying the same restrictions to both defense attorneys and
prosecutors creates a bias against the defense: first, empirical evidence shows
that trial publicity by the prosecution (and not the defense) can and has inter-
fered in fair trial; second, unlike defense attorneys, prosecutors are agents of the
state; and third, prosecutors are not expected to protect the public against "mal-
feasance in the system." Swift, supra note 7, at 1005 n.13.
191. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734 (1991). Justice
Kennedy noted, "[tlhe various bar association and advisory commission reports
which resulted in promulgation of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6
(1981), and other regulations of attorney speech, and sources they cite, present
no convincing case for restrictions upon the speech of defense attorneys." Id. at
2735 (citing Swift, supra note 7, at 1031-49, and Robert E. Dreschel, An Alterna-
tive View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the
Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 35 (1989)). Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in acknowledging that there has
been "no empirical or anecdotal evidence of a need for restrictions on defense
publicity." Id. at 2735.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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ministration of justice suffers.194
Bias also results when Model Rule 3.6 is applied to attorneys in civil
litigation.' 9 5 The mechanism for bias in civil litigation is analogous to
that which occurs in criminal prosecution. Because Model Rule 3.6 re-
stricts only the speech of those within the court's jurisdiction, a double
standard is created-"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" is ap-
plied to attorneys, while "clear and present danger" is applied to ordi-
nary citizens. 19 6 "The press may publish any information in its
possession as far as [the] rules are concerned, but the lawyers are di-
rected to try their cases in the court and not in the press."' 19 7 If the
press finds it "newsworthy" to attack a plaintiff or defendant, or if one
party is wealthy enough to hire a public relations representative, bias
can be generated against the party with only an attorney as spokesper-
son. 19 8 Further, because Model Rule 3.6 has no effect on someone
194. See id. (discussing criminal defendant's lack of accessibility to means of
disseminating information). A recent illustration of "other avenues" available to
the prosecution involves the highly publicized William Kennedy Smith case.
Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, July 24, 1991). Smith, the
nephew of Senator Edward (Ted) Kennedy, was accused of raping a woman at
the Kennedy's West Palm Beach compound during Easter weekend, 1991. Id.
The prosecution released information about three other alleged attempted
rapes involving Smith, information which would have been inadmissible at trial.
Id. On public radio, Stephen Gillers, Professor of Legal Ethics and Evidence at
New York University, commented that the prosecutor's pretrial release of infor-
mation constituted taking "the law into her own hands." Id. Gillers believed
that the information was released "to generate publicity and to circumvent the
judge's gag rule." Id.
195. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976), held that extrajudicial speech by attorneys proscribed by
Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility was
constitutionally impermissible for all stages of civil litigation. Id. at 257-58. Dis-
tinguishing civil from criminal litigation, the court determined that " 'fair trial'
does not as readily justify a restriction on speech when ...referring to civil
trials." Id. at 258. "If some restriction [was] necessary in a particular case then
perhaps a specific order [could] be entered supported by a record showing its
necessity and the unavailability of narrower restriction." Id. at 259. Although
Model Rule 3.6 was drafted in part to overcome the "overbreadth" of Discipli-
nary Rule 7-107, the Model Rule does not distinguish between civil and criminal
litigation. For a discussion of the historical development of Model Rule 3.6, see
supra notes 28-55 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of standards for attorneys and third parties, see supra
notes 68-102 and accompanying text.
197. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371-74 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding
that DR 7-107 of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad with respect to civil litigation and administrative hearings and
that certain provisions of rule were void for vagueness).
198. See, e.g., Rob Buchanan, The Ultimate P.R. Man, CONNOISSEUR, March
1990, at 74. The article profiles John Scanlon, the powerful public relations
man hired by Exxon to manage the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Exxon Valdez oil
spill spawned "crisis management," which the author describes as a "pick-me-
up" for the public relations industry. Id.
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outside the jurisdiction of the court, bias is created whenever the media
becomes involved, either because of an individual's notoriety in a crimi-
nal case or employment by a resourceful party in civil litigation.
This second "safe harbor" provision is often referred to as a "right
of reply."' 19 9 In Gentile, Justice Kennedy stated that "[a] defense attor-
ney may pursue lawful strategies . . . including an attempt to demon-
strate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to
be tried."2 00 The "right of reply" in the "court of public opinion"
should be invoked to counter adverse pretrial publicity when a client has
suffered economic, physical or emotional harm or public stigmatiza-
tion. 20 1 Although this second "safe harbor" does not always command
the same degree of First Amendment protection as when a public inter-
est is at stake, an attorney is permitted to speak outside the courtroom
when the gravity of harm to the client outweighs the possibility of preju-
dicing a pending trial.20 2
To determine boundaries for the "right of reply," an attorney must
take several factors into consideration: admissibility of evidence, nature
of proceedings, time of disclosure and size of community. 20 3 The ad-
missibility of evidence and nature of proceedings are built into Model
199. Justice Kennedy, along with Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
endorsed Gentile's motives to hold a press conference. Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2726-31 (1991). Mr. Gentile's two motives, to counter
prejudicial publicity by the prosecution and to protect his client from physical
and economic harm, supported his "right of reply" in the court of public opin-
ion. Id. at 2728. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, White and
Souter, disagreed that a "right of reply" could be used to counter prejudicial
publicity. Id. at 2747 n.6. It is important to note that Justice O'Connor did notjoin in either of these two opposing opinions. Id. at 2723.
200. Id. at 2729.
201. Id. at 2726-31. Justice Kennedy added that "[a]n attorney's duties do
not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she cannot ignore the practical
implications of a legal proceeding for the client." Id. at 2728. Dominic Gentile
believed that adverse pretrial publicity can negatively impact the mental attitude
of the client, which is an "essential litigation resource." According to Mr. Gen-
tile, a partial list of adverse consequences to the client included: 1) loss of credit
sources, 2) loss of morale, 3) loss of business or cash flow, 4) familial embarrass-
ment, 5) domestic strife, and 6) social alienation. Letter from Dominic P. Gen-
tile, Petitioner in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, to Lynn S. Fulstone, Note author
(August 21, 1991).
202. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
203. Cf Rotondo, supra note 47, at 1120-21 where the author describes fac-
tors important to the balancing test used by courts in resolving conflicts between
free speech and disciplinary rule proscriptions. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.
1025, 1032 (1984) (four years' time between publicity and jury selection greatly
diminished prejudicial effect); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567
(1976) (noting news would spread quickly because of small size of community);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966) (admonishing prosecution for
making inadmissible items available to press); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,
364-74 (4th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing between bench trials, criminal, civil and
administrative proceedings).
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Rule 3.6 as currently written.20 4 If an attorney "knows or reasonably
should know" that the attorney's comments would be inadmissible at
trial, then the attorney may not include those comments in a "right of
reply."'20 5 In addition, Rule 3.6 addresses the nature of the proceeding,
applying only to "a civil matter triable to ajury, a criminal matter, or any
other proceeding that could result in incarceration., 206 The first two
factors for an attorney to consider when contemplating a "right of re-
ply" are accommodated by the current Rule.
Model Rule 3.6, however, mentions nothing about time of disclo-
sure or size of the community. 20 7 The timing of an attorney's comments
is critical. 20 8 Whereas "[a] statement which reaches the attention of the
venire on the eve of voir dire might ... cause difficulties in securing an
impartial jury," the passage of time prior to trial diminishes prejudicial
effect. 20 9 "That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenome-
non, familiar to all." '2 10
The size of the community also influences the potential prejudicial
effect of pretrial speech. The smaller the size of the community, the
greater the prejudicial effect and the more likely the jury venire will be
tainted. 21 1 Therefore, the more time between lawyer comment and
trial, and the larger the community, the safer an attorney is in invoking a
"right of reply" on a client's behalf. The proposed revision of Model
Rule 3.6 includes time of disclosure and size of the community as factors
in the "right of reply" provision, Section (d)(2).
c. The Remedial Measures
Remedial measures are set forth in the proposed Comment corre-
204. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 §§ (b)(2), (b)(3),(b)(5), (c)(7) (1983). For the text of Model Rule 3.6, see supra note 2. Although
the current Rule addresses inadmissible evidence, it does not explicitly permit
statements pertaining to admissible evidence. The proposed revision of Model
Rule 3.6 allows limited use of statements pertaining to admissible evidence and
proper argument under subsection (d)(2)(ii), the "right of reply." For a discus-
sion of this aspect of the proposed revision to Model Rule 3.6, see supra part
IV.B. 1.
205. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(b)(5) (1983).
206. Id. Rule 3.6(b) (1983).
207. For the text of Rule 3.6, see supra note 2.
208. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2729 (1991).
209. Id. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33 (1984) (analyzing in-
verse relationship between time and jury prejudice). In Gentile, the Petitioner
invoked "the right of reply" knowing that it would be at least six months before
a jury could be empaneled. Gentile, I I I S. Ct. at 2729.
210. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1034.
211. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2729. Clark County, Nevada had a population of
approximately 600,000 persons at the time of Gentile's press conference. Id.
Justice Kennedy and three other Justices believed the size of the community was
adequate to insure impartial jury selection, particularly since Gentile's com-
ments were made six months prior to trial. Id.; cf Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976) (considering size of a community of 850 people).
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sponding to the proposed Section (d). An attorney is instructed to con-
sider these measures as alternatives to extrajudicial speech. Remedial
measures are court actions used to counter the effects of prejudicial trial
publicity and include the following: change of venue, continuance, the
use of jury instructions, jury sequestration, voir dire and prior re-
straints. 2 12 At the disposal of attorneys and judges, these measures can
be used to mitigate the effects of prejudicial trial publicity.
Voir dire questioning, one of the more effective "remedies," can be
used to assess the effect of pretrial publicity on the jury pool.2 13 If the
testimony indicates that "jurors .. .[have] such fixed opinions that they
could not judge impartially," then a continuance should be granted.2 14
Prior restraints can be tailored to individual cases, although the courts
have been reluctant to impose these drastic speech "freezing" meas-
ures. 2 15 Jury instruction and sequestration may be less effective than a
selective voir dire, change of venue or continuance. The Sheppard Court
cautioned that "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those reme-
dial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. '2 16 Unfor-
tunately, if the media initiates "trial in the court of public opinion,"
eliminating prejudice at a trial's inception may be impossible. Remedial
measures, including "right of reply," may be the only way an attorney or
the court can "cure" trial prejudice.
2. The "Substantial Likelihood" Standard Problem
Model Rule 3.6 should be revised to clarify the meaning of the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard and mandate
212. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563-64 (1976) (citing Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)). The Court in Sheppard stated that "we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial meas-
ures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such
steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial
outside interferences." Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363; cf. Swift, supra note 7, at 1049-
51. Professor Swift advocated the use of prior restraints, stating that other
forms of remedial measures were inadequate. He believed that prior restraints
were a "less restrictive alternative" to Model Rule 3.6.
213. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1033-35; see also State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d
130, 137 (N.J. 1987) (endorsing voir dire as a critical means for dealing with
potential and latent jury bias), appeal afer remand, 542 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1988), ap-
peal after remand, 594 A.2d 172 (N.J. 1991).
214. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035.
215. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 573 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
that "discussion of public affairs in a free society cannot depend on the prelimi-
nary grace of judicial censors"). For an overview of the history of prior re-
straints and the press, see Belinda J. Scrimenti, Note, A Journalist's View of The
Progressive Case: A Look at the Press, Prior Restraint, and The First Amendment From
the Pentagon Papers to the Future, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1174-85 (1980). See also
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 504-06 (1970)
(discussing roots of prior restraint in English system of censorship and evolution
in American jurisprudence).
216. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
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uniformity in interpretation. To do this, Sections (a) and (b) of the cur-
rent Model Rule 3.6 will remain as written, but are modified by the fol-
lowing proposed Comment to Section (a):
To determine whether an extrajudicial statement has a "sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative pro-
ceeding," a balancing test is used. The gravity, imminence and
likelihood of prejudice to trial from the extrajudicial statement
must be balanced against the right of an attorney to speak as
delineated in Sections (c) and (d) of this Rule. If the gravity,
imminence, and likelihood of prejudice to trial outweigh the
right to speak as defined in this Rule-restriction of speech is
appropriate. If the right to speak as defined in this Rule out-
weighs the gravity, imminence, and likelihood of prejudice-
extrajudicial speech is allowed. Interests of all relevant parties
and the availability of remedial measures must be considered in
the balancing test. Good judgment must be exercised. Since
there is no interpretive difference between semantic variations
of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard
(i.e. "reasonable likelihood," "serious and imminent threat,"
"clear and present danger") the balancing test should be uni-
formly applied to all situations where First Amendment free-
dom of speech is restricted.
This Comment strays from Chief Justice Rehnquist's sweeping
statement that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard. ' 2i 7 A single
standard is advocated in the proposed revision to the Rule because there
is no practical difference in effect when the standards are applied to real
situations. 2 18 Regardless of which "standard" is used, a balancing test
ensues. This balancing approach to restriction on speech is endorsed by
all members of the Court in Gentile and obviates the need to define dif-
ferent "standards." 2 19
217. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991).
218. For a discussion of the differences between the standards, see supra
notes 68-102 and accompanying text.
219. The balancing approach to restriction of First Amendment freedom of
speech may be the only area of consensus in the Gentile opinion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, after citing a list of Supreme Court cases dealing with the right of a
lawyer to solicit and advertise, stated that "[iln each of these cases, we engaged
in a balancing process, weighing the State's interest in the regulation of a special-
ized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of
speech that was at issue." Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744. (emphasis added). Justice
Kennedy, after stating that the drafters of Model Rule 3.6 "apparently thought
the substantial likelihood of material prejudice formulation approximated the
clear and present danger test" and that the difference between the two "could
prove [to be] mere semantics," endorsed the balancing test. Id. at 2725.
1992] NOTE
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IV. CONCLUSION
The impact of the Gentile decision spills beyond the borders of Ne-
vada to thirty-one other states currently using Model Rule 3.6.220 The
problem of balancing free speech against fair trial has always been for-
midable.2 2 1 The problem today is exacerbated because of pervasive me-
dia coverage of "newsworthy" events and sophisticated public relations
strategies. 22 2 The need for an attorney to speak out in the "court of
public opinion" to protect his client or an important public interest may
at times become paramount to the possibility of prejudicing an upcom-
ing trial. 22 3 The interests at stake demand that any rule restricting the
extrajudicial speech of attorneys be cautiously drafted and tested for ef-
ficacy. Although cautiously drafted, the current Model Rule 3.6 falls
short of this goal because it failed to provide adequate guidance to attor-
ney Dominic Gentile, the State Bar of Nevada and the Supreme Court of
Nevada. The disparity of opinion in the Supreme Court of the United
States in Gentile further evidences the failings of Model Rule 3.6 as writ-
ten. The proposed revisions to Model Rule 3.6 attempt to cure the
"void for vagueness" and the "substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice" problems illuminated by the Gentile decision.
Lynn S. Fulstone
220. For a notation of other states using Model Rule 3.6, see supra note 55
and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the history of "free speech-fair trial," see supra
notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the bias created by Model Rule 3.6, see supra notes
190-98 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of an attorney's need to speak in the "court of public
opinion," see supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
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